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This thesis examines the role of Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, in the 
country’s political economy. Using a hybrid of the new institutional economics and the 
developmental state model as the analytical framework, a historical comparative analysis 
of Myanmar’s political economic institutions during its socialist period (1962–1988) and 
market liberalization period (1988–2010) reveals that the Tatmadaw was a major actor 
with a dominant role in shaping Myanmar’s political economic institutions. Myanmar’s 
socialist trajectory was enabled by the Tatmadaw’s monopoly of force and motivated 
largely by national security and the Tatmadaw leaders’ colonial experience. Under the 
Tatmadaw’s leadership, socialist and militaristic institutions became ingrained in 
Myanmar’s political economy while the development of market-oriented institutions 
became significantly restrained. Although distorted political economic institutions caused 
the decline of Myanmar’s economy, the Tatmadaw’s desire to maintain political power 
was the key motivator for the regime to abandon socialism and embrace capitalism. 
Granted that Myanmar’s private sector has grown since market liberalization, lingering 
socialist-era norms continue to negatively influence the development of Myanmar’s 
economic policy and misshape emerging economic institutions.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 1962, the Myanmar military, or the Tatmadaw, staged a coup, after which the 
military government adopted socialism. Myanmar pursued socialist economic policies 
until 1989 when the Myanmar’s government officially abandoned socialism and 
embraced capitalism.1 How did the Tatmadaw shape Myanmar’s economic policy during 
the socialist period (1962–1988) and its subsequent market liberalization (1988–2010)? 
To underpin the analysis of the political economy of these two periods, this thesis 
examines the role of the military in shaping Myanmar’s economic trajectory from 
socialism to market liberalization and thereby identifies the core elements that explain 
Myanmar’s political economy after 2010.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The emergence of military regimes is unique to each nation state. Studying the 
role of the military within political economies leads to the understanding of how different 
societal forces, such as political, economic, and ideological factors, interact to create 
particular political outcomes. The research question contributes to the current body of 
information about Myanmar’s political economy. The research applies historical 
comparative methodology to reveal the underlying trends and factors that shaped 
Myanmar’s current economic policies. The broader implication of this thesis is that the 
identified underlying trends could serve as the starting point in identifying possible U.S. 
economic policy options for Myanmar. 
Additionally, as of 2014, the United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and 
Development still lists Myanmar among its forty eight “least developed countries.”2 As 
Myanmar attempts to address its problems of underdevelopment, context of its successes 
                                                 
1 Myat Thein, Economic Development of Myanmar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2004), 123; Tin Maung Maung Than, State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of 
Industrialization (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 356.  
2 “The Least Developed Country Report 2014,” United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2014, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2014_en.pdf.  
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and failures are important data points in areas such as market liberalization. Using 
Myanmar as a case study may help other impoverished countries reflect on their unique 
sets of challenges on their road to growth and development. 
C. A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
From 1948 to 1989, the country of Burma was referred to formally as the Union 
of Burma. The term “Burman” referred to both the Burman ethnic group and the citizens 
of the Union of Burma. In 1989, the military government officially changed the Union of 
Burma to “Myanmar,” a name that is associated with the Burman ethnic majority group.3 
The UN, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and other international 
organizations recognized this name change.4  
In support of the National League of Democracy’s (NLD) electoral victory in 
1990 and with the failure of the military government to transfer political power, the 
United States and some Western democracies refused to recognize the name 
“Myanmar.”5 The relationship between Myanmar and the United States improved with 
President Thein Sein’s reforms, which included ceasefire agreements with armed ethnic 
insurgent groups, the release of political prisoners, improved freedom of the press, and 
the participation and recognition of the NLD’s victory in securing seats during the 2012 
by-elections that culminated in President Obama’s trip to Myanmar.6 Despite the 
country’s political changes, as of 2014, the U.S. Department of State retains the policy of 
referring to Myanmar as Burma in most contexts.7  
 For this thesis, “Myanmar” is used to refer to the country formerly known as 
Burma in every instance except when “Burma” and or “Burmese” are used as part of 
organization names or ideology created before 1989. Some examples include the Burma 
Trading Company and the Burmese Way to Socialism. Depending on the context, the 
                                                 
3 Lex Rieffel, Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, ed. Lex Rieffel, (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), xiii. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Burma, Bureau of East Asian Pacific Affairs Fact 
Sheet,” December 18, 2015, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm.  
7 Ibid. 
3 
term Burman refers to the people belonging to the Burman ethnic group and to the people 
of Myanmar. According to the World Bank’s convention, the plural form of people from 
Myanmar is “Myanmar” and the adjective form of Myanmar is “Myanmar.”8 As such, 
the terms “Myanmarese” and “Myanmese” are not used in this thesis. 
D. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
To comprehend Myanmar’s contemporary economic development, understanding 
the historic foundation and circumstances of the Myanmar experience as a nation is 
crucial. Each former colony in Southeast Asia underwent a unique transformation into an 
independent sovereign country. Myanmar is no exception. The following section 
establishes the environment that gave rise to the formation of the Tatmadaw. Such 
context is relevant in the analysis of the Tatmadaw’s role in the development of 
Myanmar’s early economic institutions that led the country toward socialism.  
1. Precolonial Myanmar
Before the arrival of the British, modern-day Myanmar consisted of many smaller 
kingdoms. Clashes between the British East India Company and Myanmar’s Konbaung 
Dynasty stemmed from differences in the concept of sovereignty and territorial control.9 
In 1823, the territories of Manipur and Assam revolted. When troops from Myanmar 
pursued the assailants across the British demarcated border, the British responded with a 
large naval expedition that took Yangon by surprise.10 Myanmar was forced to abandon 
interests in Manipur and Assam, cede Rakhine and Tanintharyi territories to the British, 
pay an indemnity, and enter into an unfavorable treaty.11 
From 1837 to 1852, rebellions and upheavals led to frequent turnovers in the 
palace. In 1837, King Bagyidaw was replaced by his brother Tharrawaddy, who was later 
deposed by his son Pagan in 1846. In 1851, an appointed Yangon governor named 
8 World Bank, accessed 28 December 2015, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TRANSLATIONSERVICESEXT/Resources/CountryNamesandAdjecti
ves.doc.  
9 Norman G. Owen, ed., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History (Honolulu: 




Maung Ok, who was known for demanding extraneous payments from traders and for 
using indiscriminate criminal charges to solicit bribes, detained two British captains for 
murder. This sparked a chain of events that led to the Second Anglo-Burmese War in 
1852.12 King Pagan lost the war, and his brother King Mindon came into power in 1852.  
King Mindon tried to consolidate his power by initiating economic, 
administrative, and military reforms. Among his efforts, the pursuit of economic and 
diplomatic relationships with France and Italy was viewed unfavorably by British 
India.13 King Mindon did not name a successor before he died in 1878. After a violent 
quarrel among his queens and heirs, one of his lesser queens, Hsinbyumashin, 
successfully placed her son-in-law Thibaw on the throne. In 1885, the Myanmar court 
tried to levy a fine on a British company.14 This action started a series of events that 
prompted the third and final Anglo-Burmese war. 
2. Colonial Myanmar under the British
After Myanmar’s defeat in the Third Anglo-Burmese War, Myanmar became a 
British colony, an event that would forever change the path of Myanmar’s social, 
political, and economic trajectory. The annexation process was gradual since some 
sporadic fighting remained in the Shan and Chin areas after Mandalay fell in 1885.15 
Over the next few years, the British successfully placed Myanmar under India’s 
administration. Under the British, Myanmar’s internal ethnic migration shifted. The 
natural movement of the Kachin southward halted. The Irrawaddy delta that was once 
sparsely populated with Karen was flooded with laboring Indians and Burmans as the 
area was cleared for rice cultivation.16 The direct and indirect influence of the British 
over Myanmar’s demography had increased the contrast between the ethnic groups 
within Myanmar’s borders.  
12 Norman G. Owen, ed., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press: 2005), 89.  
13 Ibid., 90.  
14 Ibid., 1.  
15 Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win (Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1969), 2.  
16 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2001), 183. 
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The British’s focus on Myanmar was rice production. Dubbed “the breadbasket of 
India,” Burma exported approximately two million tons of rice per year from 1905 to 
1906; by the 1920s, the amount had increased to three million tons per year.17 As 
Myanmar was becoming self-sufficient, the British gradually separated its colonial 
administration of Myanmar from India. With limited administrative capacity, Britain 
governed Myanmar’s periphery hills areas differently than central Myanmar.18 Central 
Myanmar (also known as Ministerial Burma and Old Burma Proper) had a parliament 
with a restricted local democracy that had seats reserved for some minority groups such 
as the Karen, Chinese, and Indians.19 The hills areas or “excluded areas” were governed 
directly by a British governor, while administrative, legal, and financial matters remained 
in the hands of chiefs and hereditary rulers.20  
Whereas central Myanmar had a history of organized Buddhist organizations 
(such as the Young Men’s Buddhist Association, which formed in Rangoon in 1906), the 
hills areas were less impervious to the influences of Christian missionaries.21 Since the 
British recruited most of its military forces from the periphery—notably from the Karen 
population—Christianity was quick to spread and remain in the hills areas of Myanmar. 
The appearance of preferential treatment of the hills people by the British exacerbated the 
growing distrust and suspicion among the Burman nationalists.22 To the hills people, the 
British neglect of the periphery areas in contrast with the focus on the rice-producing 
deltas was a point of contention.23 Entering the 1930s, Myanmar’s social and political 
demography had been altered drastically by the British.  
                                                 
17 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd (revised) ed. (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1999) 42.  
18 Steinberg, Burma, 183.  
19 Smith, Burma, 42.  
20 Ibid., 43.  
21 Steinberg, Burma, 183.  
22 Smith, Burma, 45.  
23 Ibid., 47.  
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3. The Independence Movement and the Formation of the Tatmadaw  
The 1930s marked the beginning of the Myanmar nationalist movement. The 
Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association) consisted of students and intellectuals, and 
members started to address one another as “Thankin” (lord or master) to signify that they 
were the real rulers of the country, not the British or the Indian/Chinese business 
interests.24 In the mid-1930s, a new class of Thankin leaders emerged to include Aung 
San and U Nu.25 As the Thankin movement gained momentum, factions within the 
Dobama Asiayone developed: a large faction with an interest in Marxism that included 
Aung San and U Nu, a more nationalist faction that included little-known Ne Win, and a 
smaller short-lived faction called the Fabian League.26  
In 1939, Aung San, Soe, Ba Hein, Hla Pe, Ba Tin, and Dr. Nath founded the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB).27 In the same year, an alliance called the Freedom 
Bloc was formed between the Dobama Asiayone, politically active monks, Dr. Ba Maw’s 
Sinyetha (Poor Man’s Party), and the All Burma Student Union. With Aung San as 
secretary and Dr. Ba Maw as ahnashin (president-dictator), the goal of the Freedom Bloc 
was to pressure the British to recognize Myanmar’s right to independence by staging 
anti-British rallies inside Burma and acquiring foreign support for Myanmar’s cause. Dr. 
Ba Maw officially approached the Japanese for support in September 1939.28  
The British reacted to the Freedom Bloc’s effort. In the mid-1940s, under the 
Defense of Burma Rules, leaders of the Freedom Bloc and the Dobama Asiayone were 
arrested. Aung San and Hla Myaing escaped to Amoy in China.29 While Dr. Ba Maw 
remained in Myanmar, he made contact with Colonel Keiji Suzuki, a Japanese army 
officer assigned to conduct intelligence operations in Myanmar. The two men located 
                                                 
24 Smith, Burma, 54.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 55.  
27 Ibid., 56.  
28 Ibid., 58.  
29 Ibid.  
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Aung San and Hla Myaing in Amoy and sent them to Japan.30 In Japan, Aung San and 
Hla Myaing met Colonel Suzuki, who urged Aung San to draw a blueprint for Burma’s 
independence.31 The plan outlined steps to bring thirty volunteers to Japan to train as 
military leaders.32 In 1941, Aung San traveled back to Myanmar, recruited the thirty 
volunteers (nicknamed the “Thirty Comrades”), and brought them to Japan for training.33 
After completing the training, the Thirty Comrades traveled to Siam (Thailand) to recruit 
volunteers along the border.34 In Bangkok, on 28 December 1941, the Thirty Comrades 
took up new names, held a ceremony, and the Burma Independence Army (BIA) was 
born.35  
The BIA grew rapidly, and by May 1942, it included approximately 23,000 men. 
The size of the BIA came at the sacrifice of discipline, so in July the Japanese reduced, 
reorganized, and re-formed the BIA into the Burma Defense Army (BDA). Members of 
the BDA sided with the Japanese because they believed Myanmar’s independence was 
the ultimate prize.36 As the war progressed, the brutality of the Japanese occupation 
sickened the Burmese nationalists.37 Japan’s refusal to recognize independent Burma in 
1943 led to revolts by BDA officers such as Aung Gyi and Maung Maung.38 Although 
these revolts were kept in check by General Aung San, Colonel Ne Win, and some 
Communist leaders at the time, other Communist leaders were looking for a way to solve 
the Japanese problem. An opportunity occurred when several Communist leaders formed 
an alliance with the British Special Operation Executive Force 139, which allowed the 
BDA to turn against the Japanese.39 The BDA renamed itself in 1943 as the Burma 
                                                 
30 Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1985), 18.  
31 Maung Maung, Burma Nationalist Movement 1940– 1948, (Edinburgh, UK: Kiscadale Publications, 
1989), 26.  
32 Ibid., 59.  
33 Ibid., 27.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Smith, Burma,60; Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 (Chiang-Mai, 
Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), 44. 
37 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 72. 
38 Haji Ahmad and Crouch, Military-Civilian Relations, 21. 
39 Ibid., 22. 
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National Army (BNA).40 In 1945, the BNA went underground. With British support, the 
BNA emerged as the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF).41  
After the defeat of the Japanese and the liberation of Rangoon, the British were 
determined to disband the young nationalist army. To Aung San and other fighters, 
preserving the strength of the PBF and politically uniting the Communist, non-
Communist, civilian, and military leadership under the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom 
League (AFPFL) would force the British into negotiations without a military 
confrontation. In September 1945, General Aung San signed an agreement with the 
British South-East Asia commander Lord Mountbatten in Kandy, Sri Lanka.42 In 
accordance with the Kandy agreement, the Tatmadaw was re-formed by combining the 
British Burman Army and the PBF.43  
Concerned about the future of the periphery areas under the prospect of 
Myanmar’s independence, the Shan ethnic leaders sponsored a conference at Panglong to 
discuss the future of the ethnic states. Representatives of several (but not all) ethnic 
groups including Shan, Kachin, Chin, and Karen were present. The Panglong agreement 
was signed in February 1947 with provisions for degrees of autonomy and guarantees of 
rights and privileges for the frontier areas. In July 1947, Aung San and the de facto 
Burman cabinet were assassinated by armed paramilitaries of U Saw (the former prime 
minister of British Burma). Myanmar went into mourning for its national hero, and U Nu, 
Aung San’s AFPFL deputy, took over as prime minister.44  
Aung San’s death was a turning point for the development of Myanmar’s politics. 
At the time of his death, Aung San was the unifying force for Myanmar. His brother-in 
law was Thakin Than Tun, the leader of the CPB, an organization that had a major role in 
expelling the Japanese from Myanmar. Aung San also had a close relationship with the 
socialist faction leader, Kyaw Nyien, whom he had served with during their time on the 
Rangoon University Students’ Union executive committee. Aung San was also the leader 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 19. 
41 Smith, Burma, 60; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 73. 
42 Donald M. Seekins, History Dictionary of Burma (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006) 240.  
43 Maung Maung, Burma Nationalist Movement, 48; Smith, Burma, 65.  
44 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, xii-xiii.  
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of the Thirty Comrades and had gained the trust of many minority leaders. The fragile 
political and social solidarity of Myanmar’s union arguably rested on Aung San’s 
leadership.  
4. The Myanmar Political Economy 1948–1962  
The issues of political representation of ethnic minorities were unresolved when 
Myanmar officially gained independence in 1948. Many leaders of the ethnic minority 
groups had served as civil servants under colonial rule. They were educated and had 
developed a strong sense of their ethnic identities. Immediately after independence, 
distrust among the ethnic minority groups grew as, in their view, the Burman-dominated 
the government failed to allocate political and economic benefits equitably.45  
The government’s practice of dividing revenue according to shares of the 
population was contradictory to the minority groups’ interpretation of Aung San’s earlier 
promise. Aung San had said, “If a Burman gets one kyat, a Shan will get one kyat as 
well,” which the minority groups had interpreted as meaning one kyat for a Burman is 
one kyat for a Shan, one for a Karen, one for a Mon, and Kachin alike, but the actual 
practice was one kyat for a Burman and one kyat for all the minority groups combined.46 
Additionally, some ethnic leaders believed that since their areas were underdeveloped 
compared to Rangoon, the government should invest more in their areas.47 Tension and 
frustration felt by the minority groups motivated them to demand greater autonomy, 
which culminated into Myanmar’s first civil war under the parliamentary government in 
the same year independence was declared.  
 Years as a British colony turned Myanmar into a lopsided exporter that depended 
on the production and export of one commodity, paddy (rice).48 Most Burman peasants 
were landless paddy laborers who were “almost totally excluded from any role in the 
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process of modernization.”49 The Land Naturalization Act of 1948 was intended to 
correct these imbalances by redistributing land to the Burmese laborer (with the limit of 
ten acres each).50 After independence, the Myanmar’s government systematically took 
command of various commodities such as rice, timber, and oil.  
The economic policy in 1948 consisted of a Two-Year Plan followed by an Eight-
Year Plan. More closely resembling a list of desirable industrial projects than a strategy, 
the Two-Year Plan was never fully implemented due to a massive political uprising in the 
latter part of 1948 that consumed all the government’s resources.51 The Eight-Year Plan, 
or the Pyaidawtha Plan, was based on the report of American engineers and economists 
belonging to Knappen Tippetts Abbett Engineering Company.52 According to Prime 
Minister U Nu, the Eight-Year Plan failed to achieve targets due to the failure to restore 
law and order in the country, the lack of trained administrators to manage the projects, 
the prevalence of inefficiencies from the lack of skill, low morale and ineffective 
management, and the “lapse of time.”53 The projects had gained momentum midway into 
the plan in 1954/55 rather than in the beginning in 1950/51. These failures were 
attributed to two major assumptions of the Eight-Year Plan: that social unrest would have 
calmed by the end of 1954 and that the price for Myanmar’s rice exports would remain 
high.54 In actuality, the government never had a firm grip on the political turmoil. In the 
1950s, when the Korean War ended, the global demand for rice dropped significantly and 
so did the price. Additionally, in 1954–55 the plan had stalled due to a financial crisis.55 
The plan had no provisions that netted the support of the Tatmadaw, so when Ne Win 
came into power, he had no motivation to continue it. The Eight-Year Plan was 
abandoned after 1955–56 and later replaced by two less unrealistic Four-Year Plans.”56 
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In 1958, the AFPFL succumbed to fractionalization and split into two factions, the 
“Stable AFPFL” led by Kyaw Nyein and Ba Sew and the “Clean AFPFL” led by Nu.57 
On 28 October, the Tatmadaw assumed leadership of the caretaker government, and Ne 
Win became prime minister on a precondition that the military leadership would step 
down after the next general election. From 1958 to 1960, the Ne Win caretaker 
government kept the existing economic plan although the Tatmadaw concentrated on 
containing the black markets and inflation.58 During this period, the Defense Service 
Institute grew dramatically and transformed into a large conglomeration of business 
interests with branches that engaged in transport, finances, manufacturing, retail, and 
wholesale trades.59 In 1960, when it transferred power back to the civilian government, 
the Tatmadaw was arguably the most organized institution in Myanmar.  
From 1960 to 1962, social unrest and political division worsened. Although U Nu 
had won the 1960 election, he was unable to co-opt the opposition. In March 1962, 
General Ne Win launched his coup. Brigadier General Aung Gyi, the spokesman for the 
Tatmadaw, claimed that “economic and political crisis had forced Ne Win to depose 
President Win Maung and Premier U Nu and reinstall a military regime.”60 Other views 
were expressed by prominent Burmese political figures, such as Myanmar’s foreign 
minister at the time of the coup, Sao Hkun Hkio, who believed that the military had tasted 
political power in 1958 and that the coup was to quench its thirst for more.61 General Ne 
Win supposedly told U Zahre Lian, the Chin minister who was rounded up and taken to 
the army’s headquarters during the coup, that “Federalism is impossible; it will destroy 
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the Union.”62 Regardless of the debate about the reasons for the coup, the Tatmadaw had 
exercised its monopoly on force and overthrown Myanmar’s elected government.  
5. The Tatmadaw 1948–1962  
In the late 1940s, the Tatmadaw was a feeble, meager, and internally divided 
force. After the Kandy agreement, the intent was to incorporate Myanmar’s ethnic and 
communal divisions into the Tatmadaw.63 The unintended result was that the race and 
political leanings of the some Tatmadaw members (along with the constant interference 
by politicians and the disparate opinions between the field and the regional commanders) 
exacerbated and fractured the force.64 After political factionalism led to a civil war from 
1948 to 1952, General Ne Win, as the leader of the Tatmadaw after independence, 
contended with mutinies and the desertion of troops who followed their allegiance to 
either the Burma Communist Party or the Karen National Defense Organization.65 After 
the civil war, the Tatmadaw officer corps was greatly reduced in size and became more 
ideologically united—a unity that lasted until 1961.66  
General Ne Win’s perception was dominated by Myanmar’s colonial experience, 
his involvement in the independence movement as a member of the Thirty Comrades, and 
the failure of the early parliamentary government. The colonial experience caused 
General Ne Win’s suspicion of capitalism and foreign intervention. In a 1953 meeting at 
the residence of U Ba Swe (the Myanmar defense minister at the time), several senior 
leaders gathered to discuss Myanmar’s political path forward. General Ne Win remarked 
that the AFPFL should adopt whatever ideology “would be best suited to Burma’s needs 
and conditions.”67 He stated that “You must not depend on the big traders who make big 
money by selling import licenses to the foreign capitalists. If you do, you will continue to 
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be under their obligation. Your socialism will begin and end in slogans.”68 Although 
General Ne Win did not suggest that the government removed all foreign interests from 
Myanmar’s economy, his statement pointed to a bias toward certain business sectors and 
foreign traders.  
In the same meeting, in reference to the future of the army, General Ne Win 
directed that “We [the army and the AFPFL] have come to a parting of ways. You must 
go to your’s [sic] on the political front; we must go our way on the military….The Army 
must build itself into a People’s Army, and with the fight against insurgents and the 
Kuomintang marauders on its hands, it would be fully engaged.”69 At this time, General 
Ne Win already perceived the Tatmadaw’s role as the defender of Myanmar and the 
ethnic insurgents and foreigners as threats. To General Ne Win, political matters 
belonged to the AFPFL.  
General Ne Win’s statement on building the Tatmadaw into a People’s Army 
reflected an effort to solidify the military. Defense expenses in 1948 and 1949 were 
estimated at 40 percent of the total government expenditures.70 In 1950, the War Office 
was reorganized into the Ministry of Defense with increased authority over finances and 
administration.71 In the same year, a lengthy commanding officers (CO) conference 
highlighted the lack of cooperation between field and staff officers and addressed supply 
shortage problems.72 In the following year, the Tatmadaw established the Defense 
Services Institute (DSI), which operated several businesses for the purposes of providing 
welfare services and subsidized commodities for service members.73 After the 
reorganization, the Tatmadaw developed its first military doctrine focusing on the foreign 
invasion, mainly combating the Kuomintang (KMT) remnants.74  
68 Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win, 235. 
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In the mid-1950s, the failure of the Pyaidawtha Plan created by the American firm 
Knappen Tippetts Abbett was evident. When the price of rice fell in the early 1950s, 
Myanmar foreign reserves plunged from 1,269 million kyat in June 1953 to 628 million 
kyat in February 1955.75 Since some of the Myanmar’s economists had predicted the fall 
of the price of rice, the government’s decision to adhere to a plan that was proposed by a 
foreign firm rekindled the suspicion of foreign interests in a few of Myanmar’s political 
circle.76 U The Tun, director of Myanmar’s Central Statistics and Economics Department 
wrote, “The lesson about the use of foreign staff is that personnel from academic 
institutions or disinterested governments would have been more useful than commercial 
firms who acquire vested interest and tend to work to perpetuate their contracts.”77 The 
decline of Myanmar’s economy in this period fueled a deep-seated mistrust of foreigners, 
a sentiment that steered Myanmar toward socialism and autarky in the next decade.  
Myanmar’s economy in the second half of the 1950s continued to slump. The 
only social sectors that prospered during this period were high-level civil servants, 
businesses not associated with rice, licensees, and black market traders. Economic 
hardship aggravated the AFPFL’s internal conflicts. Since the national meeting of 
delegates in 1947, the League had not held another. By 1956, the ideological divide 
between the various factions and their party bosses had crippled the AFPFL. In response 
to the situation, U Kyaw Nyein, a Socialist Party member of the AFPFL, issued a letter 
accusing U Nu of having been corrupted by business interests and stating that the AFPFL 
socialist ideology had been compromised.78 An attempt to amend differences during the 
1958 AFPFL national conference ended in failure. In March, just two months after the 
conference, the AFPFL split into two factions, and a political opportunity was created for 
the Tatmadaw.  
Although General Ne Win maintained neutral of the Tatmadaw immediately after 
the AFPFL split, some of the Tatmadaw officers grew weary as the “Clean” AFPFL won 
the election in 1958. In the AFPFL split, the “Stable” had retained the majority of the 
75 Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw, 17.
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AFPFL members, and the “Clean” had co-opted minority groups and the National United 
Front (NUF).79 Since the NUF was known to associate with communists, the Tatmadaw 
field commanders were concerned about the ties between the NUF’s Communist 
elements and the outlawed Burma Communist Party.80 Meanwhile, political tension grew 
as the “Stable” faction demanded that the “Clean” faction vacate the AFPFL headquarters 
and turn over the League’s funds.81 Organizational rivalry between the newly created 
Union Labor Organization and the older Burma Trade Union Congress also grew as a 
source of political tension.82 In September 1958, Colonel Aung Gyi and Colonel Maung 
Maung went to see Prime Minister U Nu. Their discussion of the situation ended in an 
agreement for the U Nu government to transfer power to the Tatmadaw.83 The result was 
the formation of the 1958 caretaker government with General Ne Win as the prime 
minister.84 
For General Ne Win, the political situation had collapsed. He remarked that “It 
was imperative that the Union should not drown in shallow waters as it nearly did in 
1948–49. So it fell on the armed forces to perform their bounden duty to take security 
measures to forestall and prevent a recurrence.”85 General Ne Win was trusted with the 
caretaker government because he had been one of the Thirty Comrades who fought along 
the late Aung San, the famed Burma liberator. The transfer of power was the official 
recognition of the Tatmadaw as a national organization and the elevation of its role as the 
preserver of the Union of Myanmar. 
In the political center of Rangoon, the Tatmadaw was perceived as a righteous 
guarantor of the security of Myanmar. In the periphery regions of Myanmar, the same 
sentiment was not shared. At the end of World War II, the British sent different political 
messages to the Myanmar nationalists in Rangoon and to the ethnic minorities groups. 
Many ethnic groups, notably the Karen and Kachin, had fought bravely as a part of the 
79 Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw, 55. 
80 Ibid. 
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British forces. In return for their loyalty, the British officers had promised to support their 
Karen and Kachin troops.86 Since these promises were echoed in Aung San’s “Blue Print 
for Burma,” the minority groups believed that decisions regarding the frontier areas 
would include their consent, equivalently, that the ethnic groups had “the ultimate rights 
of self-determination.”87 The minorities’ expectations became a major source of conflict 
leading to an insurgency that consumed the Tatmadaw in the decades to follow.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis relies on a comparative analysis of two phases of Myanmar’s history: 
the socialist phase (1962–1988) and the market liberalization phase (1988–2010). The 
research focuses on policies developed and implemented by the Myanmar’s government 
under two separate eras: the socialist period under General Ne Win and the market-liberal 
period under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC). This research uses a hybrid of developmental state and 
new institutional economic (NIE) frameworks to explain Myanmar’s economic trajectory 
and its current economic strategy. A development strategy is a package of policies 
designed to drive economic activities into a “particular mixture of ownership and 
sectors.”88 This research attempts to associate government policies and strategies with 
their incentives. In analyzing these incentives, the research also tries to identify the 
social/economic pressures and the political processes that shape them. In building 
historical narratives of the two periods, this research investigates the domestic political 
processes, actors, institutions, ideologies, economic policies, and environment through an 
analysis of existing scholarship.  
Although the Myanmar’s government revoked the 1965 Law of Establishment of 
the Socialist Economic System in March 1989, the introduction of capitalism arguably 
began in 1987 with the removal of government procurement system for rice and other 
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crops.89 The 1988 Foreign Investment Law is another evidence of the Myanmar’s 
government embracing capitalism before socialism was officially denounced. To coincide 
with 1988 domestic unrest that catalyzed the introduction capitalism, this thesis uses 
1988 as the year that marks the end of socialism and the beginning of the market 
liberalization period.  
Whenever relevant, the thesis employs economic data—such as gross domestic 
product (GDP), exports and imports, interest rates, and wages—generated by institutions 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The research relies on sources such as research papers from 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) to substantiate the outcome of 
economic policies such as growth, gains in productivity, and improvement in the 
livelihood of Myanmar’s citizens. Due to Myanmar’s autarkic economic policies, much 
of the IMF and ADB data on Myanmar is missing. Many scholars have questioned the 
accuracy of Myanmar’s statistics as reported by the government to international 
organizations.90 To compensate for some of the missing data and accuracy issues, reports 
by Thailand on Myanmar exports and imports and reports by the Japanese government on 
foreign aid supplement the analysis.  
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
This thesis focuses on the role of the Tatmadaw in influencing the development 
and metamorphosis of Myanmar’s economic institutions from a socialist to a market 
economy using a historical comparative method. Although a hybrid of NIE and 
developmental state theories provides the underlying analytical framework, this thesis 
limits the NIE discussion to the creation of formal and informal institutions and the ways 
these institutions influence the development of Myanmar’s political economy. As such, 
other aspects of NIE, such as the Coase Theorem and transaction cost analysis, are 
omitted from the discussion.  
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G. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter II outlines the analytical framework 
of this thesis. The chapter provides brief background information on NIE and the 
developmental state model. The chapter also discusses the motivation behind the NIE 
developmental state framework and specifies how this thesis will use the framework to 
analyze Myanmar’s political economy.  
Chapter III addresses Myanmar’s economic developments during the socialist 
period between 1962 and 1988. The chapter describes conditions and events that 
influenced the development of economic institutions under socialism. Additionally, 
Chapter III contrasts Myanmar’s socialist political economy with that of the 
developmental state model.  
Chapter IV analyzes the development of Myanmar’s market liberalization period 
from 1988 to 2010 and describes and traces the interactions of events that influenced the 
shifts in Myanmar’s economic institutions. An evaluation of the development of 
Myanmar’s market-based economy from a developmental state point of view is also 
included in Chapter IV.  
Chapter V is a comparative analysis between the socialist and market-economy 
period to assay the role of the Tatmadaw in framing and influencing institutional changes. 
Furthermore, a comparison between Myanmar’s institutions to those of the 
developmental state model is presented. Chapter VI summarizes the major findings of 
this thesis.  
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The socialist economic strategy pursued by the government of Myanmar since 
1962 severely limited the role of private enterprise in the formulation of Myanmar’s 
political economy. After twenty-six years of socialism, a revolution swept through 
Myanmar in 1988. General Ne Win, the head of Myanmar’s government and its military, 
was replaced by a junta of senior military members. The SLORC abandoned socialism 
and embraced market liberalization. Focusing on the role of the military in shaping 
Myanmar’s political economic institutions, this thesis employs a hybrid analytical 
framework that builds on the NIE and the developmental state model. This chapter uses 
the NIE framework to establish a connection between institutions and economic strategy 
while employing developmental state theory to gauge Myanmar’s divergence from East 
Asian and some Southeast Asian economies that have adopted economic policies based 
on the model. The overall goal of the analysis is to understand how the experiences of the 
Tatmadaw influenced the emergence of certain political economic institutions that, in 
turn, led Myanmar’s economy trajectory to diverge from the developmental state model.  
A. THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
In the context of this thesis, the term “institution” has two meanings. First, 
institution refers to a particular social, political, and economic organization such as the 
Tatmadaw and the SLORC. Second, institutions are social rules that govern human 
interactions in society.91 The NIE perspective argues that the role of the state is to create 
institutions that decrease transaction costs and facilitate free and fair competition and to 
serve as an impartial referee in the application of rules and institutions. As the state 
intervenes in the market to rebalance competition, the state undergoes a trial-and-error 
process to generate favorable outcomes for all the participants. After many interventions, 
a “superior configuration of institution” emerges that satisfies almost all the economic 
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actors.92 Institutions such as property rights can define the incentive structure that 
influences transaction costs. Outside of these roles, NIE emphasizes limited government 
intervention in the economy. Once the institutions are created, competition in the private 
sector should be the primary determinant of the market price mechanism.  
The NIE’s focus on allowing the market mechanism to work stems from the 
notion that the market accelerates the development of institutions while socially 
developed institutions tend to proceed at a much slower speed.93 At the agent level, 
institution changes occur as a part of the cognitive apparatus applied through the learning 
process.94 At the societal level, institutional changes take place when all or most 
participants agree to make the changes resulting in a shift in the shared mindset that 
transforms into new values and norms.95 Since it takes time for change to be accepted by 
the majority of the participants, social institutional changes do not occur spontaneously.  
Since institutions represent consensus in human engagement, they are 
symbolically solutions to old problems.96 Arguably, when an agent enters the 
marketplace, existing institutions the agent shares with others (such as legal protection, 
property rights expectations, and the degree of freedom of exchange) help to free all the 
participants from the effort of repeatedly developing solutions to old problems and to 
direct the participants to solve new challenges as the market presents them.97 
Consequently, success is marked by agents who can best and most expeditiously develop 
innovative solutions rather than those who mechanically apply old solutions to new 
problems.  
The neoclassical description of the market centers on specialization and division 
of labor. In the context of institutional changes, specializing meant that whatever 
institutions are developed by an agent to solve market problems are unique solutions to 
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that agent’s particular set of utility challenges. Each agent’s trial-and-error process 
represents separate and individualized learning experiences. Not only that the creation of 
knowledge, learning, and change took place at a faster pace in the market than in social 
context, the fact that institutional changes do not require acceptance by all its agents to be 
valuable means that institutional changes under market pressures occur more swiftly than 
social institutional changes.98  
Under socialism, the influence of competition on the growth of economic 
institutions became diminished. From this view, as long as the Myanmar’s government 
continued to assume the market’s allocative role, theoretically Myanmar could not 
achieve a configuration of institutions that enabled prosperity while pursuing socialism. 
As the state continuously applies old solutions to new problems via centralized system, 
the state restricts the agent market learning process that consequently impacts Myanmar’s 
ability to react to economic problems.  
An NIE explanation attributes the collapse of the planned economy to the 
inefficiencies and dysfunctions of the socialist institutions. As time passes, the 
controlling interests that characterize the planned economy at its inception gradually 
wane and eventually give way to competing interests that challenge the ruling faction.99 
As these competing interests bargain and negotiate for greater shares of power, more 
resources are diverted to the distribution of wealth.100 As a result, the control 
mechanisms of the planned economy intended to sustain the state monopoly erode, 
causing serious imbalances in consumption and production. Equilibrium begins to teeter. 
The elites start to perceive more benefits in promoting change, and the economic system 
slowly liberalizes.101  
The NIE explanation for the collapse of Myanmar’s planned economy matches 
the historical development of circumstances experienced by the Tatmadaw. Competition 
for resources, political power to control the rule of the game, and prestige between the 
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regional Tatmadaw commanders in the periphery and the political Tatmadaw 
commanders in the capital does exist.102 Myanmar is rich in oil, natural gas, and timber, 
but the government lacks the investment capacity to exploit its resources. Some 
Tatmadaw commanders viewed that market liberalization would bring the necessary 
foreign investment and technical assistance to exploit the available resources.103 Others 
interpreted greater integration into the global economy as access to new markets and 
potential new avenues to expand their private business interests. According to the NIE 
framework, the controlling interests that put Myanmar on the path to socialism should 
diminish in power over time as other interests emerge. Equivalently, the Tatmadaw 
leadership that favored capitalism could gradually replace those that favored socialism. 
To a degree, this did happen as General Ne Win, who promulgated socialism, was forced 
out by the SLORC in 1988.  
Considering the historical comparative method employed by this thesis, the utility 
of the NIE is amplified. In building a story of Myanmar’s political economy through 
time, the NIE provides a continuous picture of changes. As incentives varied over time, 
institutional analysis redirects emphasis while retaining normative theoretical tools.104 
Additionally, the methodology retains rationality while providing consideration to the 
implication of ideology on the transformations of economies.105 Overlaying a 
comparison of the socialist and the market liberalization period, the NIE framework 
serves to reveal a logical story of how incentives and institutions paved the path for 
Myanmar’s political economy.  
Applying the NIE framework to Myanmar’s political economy and the Tatmadaw 
is not without some unique challenges. General Ne Win was the highest-ranking 
Tatmadaw leader. He advocated for socialism and executed his vision with the 
Tatmadaw-dominated government from 1962 to 1988. In 1989 when Myanmar 
announced it was abandoning socialism and embracing market liberalization, the 
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Tatmadaw retained its prominence in Myanmar’s politics.106 At the organizational level 
of analysis, within the NIE framework, market liberalization should have ushered in new 
organizations to replace the Tatmadaw along with new sets of accompanying institutions; 
however, the institutions (such as rent-seeking norms) created by the Tatmadaw and the 
Tatmadaw as an organization, remained largely unchanged. Here, the challenge for the 
NIE framework is how to explain shifts in economic strategy that precede institutional 
changes—an explanation that involves understanding a complex interplay of competing 
institutions in Myanmar’s politics.  
Another challenge in applying the NIE framework is the difficulty of 
distinguishing NIE from human capital theory in explaining the decline of the agricultural 
sector during the socialist era. The NIE approach advocates the inefficiency of 
institutions as the causes that brought the demise of socialism. So the decline in the 
agricultural sector is a matter of not having the proper market incentives for the Burmese 
farmers to produce. Human capital theory argues that human behaviors are derived from 
“attributes of individuals or groups, such as education, time horizons, or values.”107 From 
this perspective, the cause of the decline in agricultural output is the cultural nature of 
Burmese farmers. Steinberg, in his analysis of the farmers’ incentives wrote:  
The farmer throughout this period received little inducement to improve 
the quality of his product even though the government tried to encourage 
the sowing of high-quality seeds. The cultivator had few needs and was 
able to purchase consumer goods at relatively stable prices. . . .He found 
himself standing alone against predator insurgents and dacoits as well as 
against a government that did not listen closely to what he said. . . . 
Conservative by nature, he wanted little beyond what he grew and, most of 
all, to be left alone by government and insurgents. His cash income 
together with monies he borrowed satisfied his needs, and when he had a 
little left over, he invested it in festivals and religious activity—giving a 
feast or decorating a pagoda.108  
From the passage, the Burmese farmer’s “propensity to truck and barter” seemed 
to be stymied by his “conservative nature.” It is possible to read the passage and derive 
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institutional incentives as the motivator of the farmers’ behavior, albeit inconclusively, 
since the farmer could have saved what he had left over to expand his productivity. Since 
the human capital theory cannot completely be discredited—even though the applicability 
of the NIE remains—the exclusivity of the NIE framework to derive an explanation is 
open to question.  
One of the criticisms of the NIE approach is that the framework is too broad. 
Concepts such as property rights and the rule of law are umbrellas that cover myriads of 
subtopics. The framework provides no prescriptions for how to establish property rights 
nor answers the question of how to fairly allocate economic resources. Upon achieving 
independence, many countries embarked on land reforms as one of the measures to 
establish property rights for the local populations. These early economic measures shaped 
the social and economic structures and incentives of the economic system that would 
later develop. The NIE framework concentrates on the role of the government in 
establishing institutions that enabled the forces of competition to regulate the emerging 
market.109 The weakness of NIE is that the theory does not specify the amount of time 
that must pass from when institutions are created to when a stable market economy is 
established. After land reforms, many Southeast Asian postcolonial economies stagnated. 
The NIE framework does not account for the uncertainty that exists from the time when 
the government created institutions to when market equilibrium is achieved.  
Despite these shortfalls, NIE remains a viable model for the analysis of 
Myanmar’s economy. Although the NIE framework concentrates on market institutions 
such as property rights and rule of law, the introduction of institutions as the unit of 
analysis provides both a broad and a narrow lens through which to examine Myanmar’s 
political economy. The influence of protracted insurgency, the colonial experience, the 
idealism of the early nationalists, the failure of the parliamentary government, and social 
unrest can be explained in terms of how they change, shift, and create institutions. 
Institutions also serve to normalize the numerous facets of challenges that Myanmar had 
faced on its road to create a market economy. Social norms are generalized as means of 
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solving social problems and serve as platforms for overcoming social conflicts.110 As 
such, an NIE lens allows this thesis to analyze social factors and justify the outcome of 
conflicts. It can also address capacity questions. What are the Tatmadaw’s capacities to 
bring about economic development and social modernization? Answering such questions 
involves an understanding of not only a variety of factors, but also of their different 
weights and of the dynamics when they are combined. Finally, the NIE lens can also 
provide a basis for logical predictions of plausible futures given the government’s current 
ability.  
B. THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE MODEL 
Myanmar’s stark divergence is not grounds for dismissal of the developmental 
state model as an analytical tool. On the contrary, the developmental state approach is 
useful in providing a framework that rationalizes Myanmar’s lackluster growth. 
Accounting for what is missing is as revealing as finding justification for what is present. 
In essence, the state of Myanmar’s political economy can be measured in terms of how 
far it has diverged from the developmental state model.  
The groundwork for the developmental state model was laid by investigations of 
the underlying reasons for the stellar economic growth experienced by Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore by scholars such as Chalmers Johnson, 
Stephan Haggard, Tun-jen Cheng, and Hagen Koo. In their works, economic successes 
were seen to result from a combination of close cooperation between the public and 
private sectors, capable bureaucracy that insulated from political influences, high rates of 
savings, an emphasis on growth with equity, strong and stable autocratic or single-party 
government, and government skilled at particular forms of market intervention.111 The 
performance of these Asian economies demonstrated an alternative to both the laissez-
faire and socialist models: economic success is possible under a planned market system. 
Furthermore, the developmental state model challenged the notion that democracy is 
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necessary for prosperity. The model established the basis for how the stability, cohesion, 
and discipline of autocracy can translate to economic performance.  
Academic works that use the developmental state lens to analyze Myanmar’s 
political economy are scarce due to many sharp divergences between Myanmar’s 
economic policies and those of the developmental state. Myanmar lacks three crucial 
factors that were ascribed as reasons for the economic success under the developmental 
state model. First, economic prosperity through guided cooperation between the public 
and the private sector is unlikely to happen in Myanmar because of its underdeveloped 
private sector. Early in the socialist period, Myanmar nationalized most of its industries, 
causing a massive exodus of Indian commercial interest. Between 1963 and1967, some 
300,000 Indians and 100,000 Chinese reportedly left.112 Since Indians were the most-
capable civil servants in Myanmar (due to their history with the British colonial 
administration) and the overwhelming majority of Myanmar’s capitalist class, 
Myanmar’s state capacity dwindled with their departure.113 Second, in terms of a strong 
autocratic government, Myanmar had decades of strong military rule under General Ne 
Win (1962–1988) and under the SLORC/SPDC (1988–2010). Nonetheless, 
macroeconomic choices such as the exchange rate policy and the demonetizations of the 
kyat question whether the government is capable of enacting macroeconomic policies 
that are conducive to economic growth and stability.114 Last, the protracted insurgency 
with the ethnic minority groups consumed much of Myanmar’s state budget. The limited 
funds that remained for social welfare, such as education, compounded the damage to the 
already shrinking pool of capable technocrats to administer the country. Growth with 
equity was a grave challenge that was largely unmet by the Myanmar’s government.  
The divergence between Myanmar’s economic growth and that of the 
developmental states are stark. In 2012, Myanmar’s GDP per capita was $1,421.50, 
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whereas South Korea’s was $24,454.00.115 Myanmar’s neighbor, Thailand, who adopted 
some of the developmental state model’s mantra, posted a figure of $5,448.80.116  
C. THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS THESIS  
No single framework is sufficient to account for the dynamics of Myanmar’s 
political economy. This research attempts to craft an explanation by combining the NIE 
and the developmental state approaches. One motivation behind the hybrid approach is 
that the developmental state model naturally has embedded elements of NIE. The 
mechanism that made possible the close cooperation between public and private sectors 
in the developmental state is institutions. The success of the developmental state 
government to execute its industrial policies is dependent on the collaborative norms 
between politically insulated technocrats and private firms.117 The Asian newly 
industrialized countries (NIC) were able to make industrial adjustments as a result of 
institutionalized patterns of policy development, state intervention, and state-business 
cooperation.118 Considering the roles of institutions in the application of the 
developmental state framework is natural.  
The other motivation is that the developmental state model alone is inadequate in 
identifying prevailing institutions that influence the shaping of Myanmar political 
economy. The developmental state model provides no provision for analyzing and 
explaining the role of the Tatmadaw in creating institutions that guide Myanmar’s 
economic direction. The developmental state framework is limited to viewing the state 
and its role from the perspectives of political stability, the relationship with technocrats 
and private sector, and the understanding of market forces. Although the developmental 
state model made a compelling case for the relevance of these factors, other extraneous 
factors that fall outside of the model (such as the regime’s military mindset and military-
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based norms such as strict adherence to hierarchy in decision making, placing high 
priority on absolute loyalty, and harsh punishment for dissent) should not be omitted 
when trying to construct a country’s overall economic narrative.  
The developmental state framework has been aptly used to explain South Korea’s 
economic growth. According to the model, Park Chung-hee’s autocratic state created the 
political conditions for the developmental state to emerge.119 The relationship between 
Park Chung-hee’s administration and the chaebol (Korean private business 
conglomerations), coupled with the state’s industrial policies, propelled unprecedented 
economic growth in the 1960s with GDP growth that jumped from 3.9 percent annually 
in 1961/62 to 9.2 percent annually from 1963 to1966.120 Even though Park Chung-hee 
was a South Korean military general, the developmental state model provides no 
groundwork explaining how, why, or to what degree Park Chung-hee’s experience as a 
military leader shaped the emergence, perpetuation, or decline of the South Korean 
developmental state. In the case where the military has a heavy influence over the control 
of the state, considering the role of the military in creating market institutions helps build 
a comprehensive picture of the country’s political economy. The majority of 
developmental state analyses have concentrated on the presence or absence of factors 
contributing to success. Since the developmental state model does not stipulate the 
regime type, the role of the military-centric government was swept under the umbrella of 
“soft authoritarianism.” Because the model does not provide an analytical space to 
examine the military as a separate entity, little has been investigated on the role of the 
military in conjunction with the emergence of the developmental state.  
This thesis attempts to supplement these deficiencies of the developmental state 
model with the NIE framework. Using the NIE lens, the examination of Myanmar’s 
political economy extends to the role of the military government in creating barriers to 
market institutions during the socialist period and promoting fair and open competition 
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during market liberalization period. To identify the prevailing elements that shaped the 
Myanmar political economy, the analysis of institutional factors extends beyond the 
question of whether the Myanmar’s government created market institutions and what 
kind of institutions the Myanmar’s government created. Comprehensive research 
involves exploring why certain institutions emerge in Myanmar, how and why they 
persist, whether they change over time, and how they are adopted. Central to answering 
these questions is understanding the Tatmadaw, the most enduring and entrenched 
institution in Myanmar since its independence and undeniably the most influential 
organization in Myanmar’s political economy.  
The analytical framework of this thesis directs focus on the motivations of key 
Myanmar political leaders, namely General Ne Win and the SLORC/SPDC, the social 
interactions between the junta and other economic actors, formal and information 
institutions, and any spontaneous or deliberate processes that are responsible for the 
emergence of market institutions. Central to this thesis is the analysis of Tatmadaw as the 
dominant organization that heavily influenced Myanmar’s politics, economics, and 
security environment. Since Myanmar’s independence, the Tatmadaw has matured as an 
organization and developed particular attitudes toward the economy. A comparison 
between the socialist and the market liberalization periods reveals events that shaped new 
beliefs, norms, and outlooks that translated into shifts in Myanmar’s economic policy.  
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III. SOCIALIST PERIOD (1962–1990)  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the development of socialism in 
Myanmar in terms of General Ne Win’s strategy to establish an authoritarian military 
state and the shaping of Myanmar’s political economy as the result of this effort. The first 
section discusses the role of the colonial and independent experience in the seeding of 
socialist ideology. The second section provides a background of the formulation of 
Myanmar’s socialist state, with an emphasis on the role of the Tatmadaw in espousing 
and implementing the socialist ideology. The third section details Myanmar’s socialist 
economic policies as they relate to the destruction of liberal market institutions. The 
fourth section compares Myanmar’s socialist political economy with the developmental 
state model.  
A. THE ROOTS OF SOCIALISM IN THE COLONIAL AND INDEPENDENT 
EXPERIENCE  
Myanmar’s leaning toward socialism has deep roots in societal resentment about 
the exclusion of the Burmese population from the colonial economy. As a British colony, 
Myanmar’s economy was state-directed and administered by foreigners, mainly Indians 
and some Chinese.121 Trade—both export and import—was dominated by foreigners 
with the Burmese occupying the agricultural sector.122 On the eve of independence, 
Myanmar had a robust economy dominated by Indian business interests.123 The Burmese 
population saw their exclusion from economic opportunities as a barrier to development, 
a viewpoint that Myanmar’s early leaders sought to destroy along with any organizations 
and associated market institutions.124 The fierce rejection of the colonial economic 
system that had excluded the Burmese from the economy contributed to Myanmar’s early 
socialistic leanings.125 The result was socialism and nationalization of foreign interests. 
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In the late 1940s, the Indian population in Yangon was estimated at around one million 
with the majority employed in various businesses and crafts such as rice mills and trading 
and commerce companies, and as private lenders.126 With nationalization of industries, 
Indian business interests left Myanmar.  
Anticolonial sentiment was so deeply entrenched that Myanmar’s leaders missed 
opportunities to foster liberal market institutions. Immediately after independence in 
1948, Myanmar’s economy remained largely private with Indians dominating the 
business sector. This was in spite of the government’s initiating numerous efforts to 
increase the presence of Burmese in the economy, such as controlling the sale of import 
and export licenses to foreigners.127 This effort was unsuccessful as there were few 
highly educated Burmese to run successful businesses. One of the first economic policies 
enacted by the AFPFL government after independence was to take over the rice and the 
timber industries from foreign monopolies.128 Other foreign companies, such as the 
Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, the Burma Corporation, and the Burma Oil Company, were 
either nationalized or became a joint venture.129 Rather than fully taking control, the 
Myanmar’s leadership could have taken the opportunity to co-opt foreign business 
interests just as Malaysia’s independence leaders co-opted the Chinese and Indian 
business interests into their nations after independence. The presence of outward-looking 
Indian business interests would have provided a liberal option to socialist market 
institutions. The resistance in the minds of Myanmar’s leaders to the colonial economy 
was so ferocious that they did not consider this path an option.130 Instead, Myanmar’s 
leaders enacted policies that caused the mass exodus of Indian and Chinese business 
interests.131 As a result, Myanmar lost a large portion of its business that would have 
been the voice of free-market interests.  
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B. MYANMAR AS A SOCIALIST STATE: THE TATMADAW TAKE OVER 
Myanmar’s political economic trajectory toward socialism had roots in the 
country’s colonialism and independence, but it was the work of a soldier that turned 
Myanmar into a socialist society. In the market-based colonial system, the Burmese 
people perceived an economic bias in favor of foreign business interests at the sacrifice of 
Burmese labor and natural resources. Actions taken by Myanmar nationalists to free the 
country from the grips of economic oppression included the creation of a revolutionary 
army that later became the Tatmadaw.  
Although he was one of the Thirty Comrades, General Ne Win was not a 
prominent personality in Myanmar’s nationalist movement immediately after 
independence. When General Aung San was negotiating Myanmar’s independence in the 
mid to late 1940s, General Ne Win’s role was to prepare for a “possible attack” if the 
peace talks went awry.132 If independence was assured, the role included building a 
Myanmar defense force.133 The Tatmadaw remained weak in the 1940s due to defections 
such as the formulation of the People’s Volunteer Organization and the Karen and 
Kachin troop rebellions that siphoned troop strength from the Tatmadaw.134 At one point 
in 1948, the Tatmadaw had less than two thousand soldiers.135  
In the 1950s, under General Ne Win, the Tatmadaw reorganized itself under the 
new Ministry of Defense, becoming more institutionalized and independent of civilian 
oversight.136 During the caretaker government, the military left the governmental and 
economic infrastructures untouched while focusing on enforcing law and order, to 
include embarking on projects such as relocating squatters out of many sections of 
Rangoon. The Tatmadaw’s actions during the caretaker period indicated that the army 
“believed itself to be as representative of the entire nation as elected politicians might be 
and perhaps even morally better,” and that the Tatmadaw had “believed itself to be the 
                                                 
132 Robert H. Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2015), 83. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Ibid., 46.  
135 Ibid.  
136 Ibid., 48.  
 34 
vanguard which had proved itself in the course of the fight for national independence and 
against the insurgents.”137 With such sentiments, the Tatmadaw emerged from the 1950s 
more centralized and cohesive with the legitimacy of a national institution.  
When Ne Win launched his coup, the Tatmadaw was the basis of his political 
power. The Tatmadaw in 1962 was a different organization than during the independence 
and the parliamentary period. Large ethnic units had already split from the Tatmadaw.138 
The few commanders (such as the Revolutionary Council (RC) vice-chairmen, General 
Aung Gyi and General Tin Oo) who voiced different ideologies from General Ne Win’s 
were removed through personnel purges.139 The DSI was expanding and providing 
necessary welfare for the troops. When combined with the factionalized AFPFL, the 
weakened Communist elements, and the declining NUF party, General Ne Win, as the 
leader of the elevated Tatmadaw, was politically invincible.  
The March 1962 coup was a watershed event in Myanmar’s political economic 
trajectory because it was the point where Myanmar’s mixed economy of the post–
independence era ended and the socialist economy began. The military blamed the 
civilian parliamentary government for failing to “realize the potential of the 
economy.”140 With the relative success of the Tatmadaw’s stewardship during the 
caretaker period, the military came to believe it had the power to steer the country back to 
its socialist beginnings.141 After expelling the civilian government in March 1962, 
General Ne Win created and installed the RC as the new head of government. A few 
months later, the new regime announced the Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS) and 
published the Constitution of the Burma Socialist Programmed Party (BSPP).142 The 
main features of the BWS focused on eliminating foreign interests from Myanmar’s 
domestic economy, an inward-looking economic strategy aiming at reducing Myanmar’s 
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reliance on foreign markets, and a shift toward a “more balanced industrial state” in 
which the state, not market forces, managing economic development.143  
From 1962 to 1988, although still combating insurgency in the outlying areas of 
Myanmar, the Tatmadaw’s role had shifted toward building a socialist political economy 
and the organization became the backbone of the socialist changes in Myanmar.144 
Immediately after the coup, the role of the Tatmadaw in the politics of the newly created 
socialist state was clear. After the first day of the 1963 annual CO conference, General 
Ne Win remarked that “a great and growing responsibility rests on the shoulders of the 
defense forces in political, administrative, and economic fields.”145 During the socialist 
era, the members of the Tatmadaw became the political mechanism that enabled General 
Ne Win to realize his socialist vision. Almost a decade after the coup, in 1971, at the 26th 
Armed Forces Day Parade, vice chief of staff Brigadier Thaung Dan stated that “We, 
members of the armed forces must cooperate with the working people in carrying out our 
respective duties for the success of the present socialist, social revolution.”146 The role of 
the Tatmadaw had extended beyond the defense of Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity to fulfilling a socialist revolution envisioned by its leadership.  
1. Organization and Link with the Burma Socialist Programme Party 
For the first decade after the coup, the seventeen-member RC centralized political 
decisions. Fourteen of the seventeen RC members were former Burma Independent Army 
members; in other words, they were General Ne Win’s old war cronies.147 Dominated by 
military members, the BSPP adopted the Tatmadaw’s “vanguard” outlook—the party 
members believed that the BSPP was a champion party for the working class with a “self-
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asserted knowledge that it knows what is best for the people.”148 Ten years after its 
founding, the BSPP grew to be the monolith party.  
The National Defense College played a role in establishing the ideological 
uniformity of the Tatmadaw. Although the college was formally established in 1958, after 
the 1962 coup, institutions such as the BSPP-operated Central Institute of Political 
Science (CIPS) were added to indoctrinate civilian and military personnel.149 The official 
BSPP ideology, known as “System of Correlation of Man and His Environment,” became 
required material for the CIPS ideology course.150 By the time the promulgation of the 
1974 constitution officially transferred Myanmar’s political leadership from the RC to the 
BSPP, every Tatmadaw officer was a member of the BSPP.151  
The entrenchment of the Tatmadaw in the BSPP created an informal institution 
that cemented the Tatmadaw’s loyalty to the BSPP. For junior and senior Tatmadaw 
members alike, membership in the BSPP meant access to a “Soviet-style nomenklatura” 
system, in which the member’s career advancement came at the approval of the BSPP.152 
For the Tatmadaw members, the act of discrediting or questioning the BSPP’s ideology 
meant jeopardizing their military careers. With advancement incentives tied to political 
party loyalty, the Tatmadaw became an armed extension of the BSPP.  
The internal organizational fractionalization of the Tatmadaw during the civil war 
period (such as the revolt of the Karen rifle units and the mutiny of the procommunist 
faction of the Tatmadaw that occurred in the late 1940s) led to its majority Burman 
leadership’s cautioning against the formulation of cliques within the organization.153 As a 
result, the Tatmadaw underwent several impactful personnel purges such as the 1976 and 
1977 dismissals of several senior Tatmadaw leaders and the 1983 purge of the 
intelligence corps.154 These arrests of five members of the handpicked RC officers were 
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evidence of the general’s severe disdain for dissent.155 Consequently, the personnel 
purges amplified the importance and acceptance of the existing militaristic norm of 
obedience.  
The expansion of the Tatmadaw also increased the number of BSPP members, 
albeit slowly. In 1948, Myanmar had fifteen infantry battalions under two regional 
commands.156 In 1962, with the transformation of the Union Military Police into new 
Tatmadaw battalions, the Tatmadaw had a total of 84 battalions by 1963.157 By 1968, the 
Tatmadaw had grown to 99 infantry battalions, 5 regional commands, 2 infantry brigades, 
and 3 Light Infantry Divisions (LID).158 When the BSPP was formed in 1962, it had 24 
full members. By 1971, the party had 73,369 full members, of which 42,359 were 
members of the Tatmadaw, with an additional 260,857 candidate members.159 The 
gradual growth of the party suggests that during the first 10 years of socialism, the RC 
was selective of the party cadre membership and that members of the military were 
deemed as good candidates.  
On 20 April 1972, General Ne Win resigned from the military and became U Ne 
Win and Myanmar’s first premier. The ceremonial removal of the military rank had little 
impact on the political structure of Myanmar’s socialist government since U Ne Win 
remained the prime minister and the chairman of the newly-organized fifteen-member 
RC.160 Two years later, on 2 March 1974, U Ne Win became the first president of the 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Myanmar and chairman of the 451-member Pyithu 
Hluttaw (People’s Assembly). The changes were superficial as U Ne Win was still the 
undisputed leader of the country as he supervised the general secretary of the party and 
the commander in chief of the Tatmadaw.161 Stemming from the highest level of 
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leadership, the interdependence between the Tatmadaw and the BSPP continued to 
deepen even after the U Ne Win was replaced by the SLORC in 1988.  
2. Political Suppression and Ethnic Insurgency  
The Tatmadaw’s monopoly over the use of force lessened the possibility of a 
structural change that did not align with the Tatmadaw’s socialist vision and decreased 
the role of other groups and forces (such as Buddhism) in Myanmar’s political life.162 
The 1962 coup accompanied demonstrations that broke out at Rangoon University over 
new regulations imposed by the new regime. The Tatmadaw responded with brutal force, 
firing at close range at the protestors and dynamiting the student union building that had 
been a symbol of Myanmar’s civil society since the 1930s.163 The violent suppression of 
the student protestors in 1962 was the first indication that the use of force had been 
institutionalized as the Tatmadaw’s method of exerting political authority. The Tatmadaw 
would use the same oppressive and violent suppression methods during the 1974 
workers’ strike, the U Than funeral protest, and the 1975/76 student demonstrations.164 
Through violent political suppression, the Tatmadaw eliminated political opposition 
groups and reinforced the prominence of the BSPP as “the sole political party” and leader 
of the state.165  
Throughout the socialist period, Myanmar continued to be plagued with waves of 
insurgent activities. In the late 1960s, the Tatmadaw’s “four cuts” strategy of denying the 
insurgents food, funding, information, and recruits drove the minority insurgents from the 
lower and central deltas into the outlying hills in the north and northeast regions of 
Myanmar. These remote regions required greater military equipment, manpower, and 
resources to operate. In the 1970s, the Tatmadaw was too small and underfunded to 
defeat and contain the insurgency in these areas. With knowledge of the terrain and 
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sympathy from the local inhabitants, the number of insurgents grew.166 The insurgency 
occupied the Tatmadaw’s effort and consumed Myanmar’s revenue for the next three 
decades. In 1960, Myanmar’s military expenditure as a percentage of combined 
education and health expenditures was 241 percent compared to 207 percent for 
Indonesia and 96 percent for Thailand. By 1990, the military’s expenditures remained 
high at 222 percent, whereas expenditures had declined to 49 percent for Indonesia and 
71 percent for Thailand.167 The high expenditures are evidence of the Tatmadaw’s 
considerable influence and priority in Myanmar’s economy.  
C. THE DECLINE OF LIBERAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS  
Of the many explanations of why socialism was favored by Myanmar’s 
nationalists, one traced back to the circumstances surrounding the ethnic Burman’s 
colonial experience—the view that capitalism was associated with the economic tyranny 
of colonialism. Even though Myanmar’s government started formulating plans for a 
planned economy as early as 1947, its political economy after independence and up to the 
1962 coup still contained a strong private sector. Only after the 1962 Tatmadaw coup did 
Myanmar became a full-fledged authoritarian socialist state—a process that would 
include the destruction of liberal market institutions.  
1. Myanmar’s Economic Policies and Institutions after the Coup  
With the 1962 coup, the RC overthrew the parliamentary government and 
embarked on massive political and economic reforms. The Tatmadaw and its political 
instrument, the BSPP, altered the fundamental incentive structure of Myanmar’s political 
economy with the initiation of socialism. The Myanmar’s government nationalized the 
banking sector and much of the private sector, banned imports in 1963, and prohibited 
exports in 1964.168 The start of any new private businesses was halted.169 With a state-
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run central bank, the government made decisions on capital allocation vice potential 
return and risks.170 Funds were channeled to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and 
cooperatives based on the previous year, consequently perpetuating status quo 
administrative routines instead of encouraging innovative new business practices.171 The 
nationalization of farmland, directed cultivation, and government procurement that was 
initiated in 1948 intensified after 1962.172 The increase in government intervention in the 
agriculture sector and the government’s prerogative to keep prices of basic commodities 
low had destroyed the farmers’ incentives to produce and innovate.173 The direct result of 
nationalization was the depletion of incentives for production, efficiency, and innovation 
in all affected sectors that led to the decline of the entire economy.  
The economy deteriorated rapidly. By 1966/67, rice exports had declined to 0.64 
million tons from 1.6 million tons in 1962/63.174 The self-reliant socialist economic 
policy also drastically hurt Myanmar’s revenue. From 1962 to 1965, Myanmar’s average 
annual GDP growth was 4.9 percent. From 1966 to 1969, GDP growth decreased to 2.2 
percent and further dipped to 1.3 percent in 1970 and 1973.175 The economic decline 
alarmed the Myanmar’s government and forced its attention to the struggling economy. 
2. Myanmar’s Economic Policies and Institutions in the 1970s  
In the 1970s, a shift in Myanmar’s economic institutions was marked by an 
increase in pragmatism embraced by the Myanmar’s government with regard to 
economic policies. The BSPP released businessmen who had been imprisoned as 
“economic insurgents” and allowed foreign investment to return.176 The party also 
softened some of its self-reliant policy by accepting more foreign aid.177 Recognizing 
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that the state cannot control all aspects of the economy, the RC enacted the Cooperative 
Societies Law that introduced cooperatives as a means to improve the inadequate 
distribution system through decentralization of authority to the township level.178 The 
party also expelled the old architects of the BWS, General Tin Pe and U Ba Nyent, and 
openly admitted the shortcomings of the BWS through a 1971 publication of new 
economic reforms titled “Long-Term and Short-Term Economic Policies of the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party” (LTSTEP).179  
LTSTEP was built on four foundations: using natural resources such as 
agriculture, fisheries, and mining; promoting import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 
that focused on processing domestic commodities for domestic consumption; building 
material incentives into the economic structure; and accepting foreign aid and foreign 
loans.180 Working within the confines of the four foundations, executing LTSTEP was 
problematic. The acceptance of aid was a major deviation from Myanmar’s socialist 
ideology and may have been the lifeline of Myanmar’s struggling economy for years to 
come. However, the import-substitution policy limited the availability of advanced heavy 
machinery and raw materials, and that retarded the industrialization progress. Even 
though some technical assistance accompanied foreign aid and loans, without direct 
foreign investments fueled by commercial interests, the development of technical 
capability was slow.181  
At the Second BSPP Party Congress in 1973, the BSPP issued a Twenty-Year 
Plan (TYP) that was meant to stretch from 1974/75 to 1993/94. The goal of the TYP was 
to turn Myanmar from an agriculture-based to an agro-industrial economy and to develop 
“socialist production relations.”182 The TYP consisted of five Four-Year Plans (FYPs). 
The first FYP was curtailed to two years and only lasted from 1971/72 to 1973/74. The 
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second FYP stretched from 1974/75 to 1977/78, the third FYP from 1978/79 to 1981/82, 
the fourth FYP from 1982/83 to 1985/86, and the fifth from 1986/87 to 1989/90.183  
Myanmar’s economy in the 1970s was dominated by the first and second FYPs. 
GDP growth under the shortened first FYP was about 1 percent due to the inefficiencies 
of the SOEs, stagnant export growth, and adverse weather.184 The failures of the first 
FYP would lead to the early implementation of the second FYP, which was designed to 
rectify production inefficiencies, stressed export, and reduced waste.185 With the second 
FYP, Myanmar’s government started to shift away from socialist ideology and embraced 
practicality by modifying its self-sufficient policy by accepting more foreign aid and 
investment and by attempting to create formal property rights institutions.  
The formulation of the World Bank’s Burma Aid Group in 1976 brought a 
dramatic increase in foreign loans and aid. By 1979, Myanmar’s annual gross receipts 
quadrupled from about $75 million in 1976 to $359 million in 1979.186 Overseas 
development aid (ODA) became Myanmar’s primary source of foreign exchange 
earnings. As a consequence, Myanmar maintained a modest 4.7 percent average annual 
GDP growth from 1974 to 1977 and a 6.5 percent growth from 1978 to 1981.187 Since 
aid and loans did little to solve poor management and the lack of production incentives 
issues, the growth figures hid true signs of economic trouble, some of which emerged in 
full force in the mid-1980s.  
In 1977, the Myanmar’s government passed the Rights of Private Enterprise Law, 
which gave legal status to private enterprises (Myanmar citizens) to engage in specific 
economic activities such as the cultivation of certain crops, fishing, fish breeding, 
transport, and the trade of some commodities not reserved for SOEs and cooperatives.188 
The law also offered protection against nationalization until 1994 and carried severe 
penalties for causing price instability, restructuring, and relocating without 
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authorization.189 On the surface, the law seemed to lower institutional barriers for 
individuals to engage in trade; however, SOE exclusivity was preserved. In sum, little 
was changed to reform Myanmar’s incentive structure to favor the growth of private 
enterprises and increase the efficiency and production of the SOEs.  
The tax system outlined in the TYP severely limited the incentives for innovation 
and entrepreneurship. In 1976, tax on business profit was 90 percent on profits of more 
than 300,000 kyat. The Union of Burma Bank, also established in 1976, was meant to 
facilitate financial resources for SOEs and the small private sector. In 1977, the 24 
percent interest rate on small-scale personal loans and 9 percent rate on car purchase 
loans meant only a small pool of government employees and property owners could 
afford to borrow, while the bank made huge profits.190 The Myanmar tax system under 
the BSPP penalized profitability and destroyed the incentive for private enterprise to 
grow or to increase production efficiency.  
Since the goal of the 1970s reforms was to increase state revenue rather than 
promote development, Myanmar’s economy continued to be plagued by the prevalence of 
inefficiencies and distorted market incentives. Without formal market institutions such as 
property rights and courts, Myanmar’s economy relied on informal institutions. In the 
official economy, patronage and government connections required to gain permits and 
contracts became incentives for profit.191 In the black market, personal relationships with 
trusted conveyors became the incentives for profit. Leaving the 1970s, Myanmar had 
missed opportunities to make meaningful economic reforms. Although signs of pragmatic 
changes had emerged, Myanmar’s leadership remained steadfast in its socialist ideals.  
3. Myanmar’s Economic Policies and Institutions in the 1980s  
Myanmar’s economy limped along in the early 1980s. The third FYP, which 
started in 1978/79 and concluded in March 1982, achieved some success. The Myanmar’s 
government announced that the 6.7 percent GDP growth had exceeded the third FYP 
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target of 6.6 percent (see Table 1).192 The introduction of chemical fertilizer and a high-
yielding variety of paddy increased the average yield of 36.8 baskets in 1976/77 to 57.06 
baskets in 1981/82.193 Although the paddy yield increased, the overall rice export in 
1981/82 of 905,000 tons was still historically low compared to 1.676 million tons in 
1961/62 and 3.123 million tons in 1940/41.194  
Myanmar reported an increase in rice production in the late 1970s to early 1980s, 
but the incentive behind the increase was government coercion. The government 
threatened the farmers to conform to government cultivation programs or risk forgoing 
their agricultural rights. Little improvement in growing technology was made during this 
period. Draft cattle continued to be the dominant source of power to till the land 
(government shortages, maintenance problems, and fuel shortages had led the farmers to 
favor cattle).195 Myanmar’s government expressed its appreciation of the role of the 
farmers in increasing production by establishing rural projects (such as supplying water, 
health care, and cattle insurance).196 As a result of government efforts, the status of the 
farmer was elevated to a respectable class in society—a stark difference from its 
“exploited” status during the colonial era.197 Regardless, the government’s practice of 
controlling the price of rice continued to embitter many farmers as they saw great 
increases in prices of other non-government-controlled agricultural products but only 
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Table 1. Financial Plan, Plan Targets, and GDP Growth 
(1971–1988) 
Fiscal Year Financial Plan 
Plan Targets 
GDP Growth B 
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Adapted from Tin Maung Maung Than, State Dominance, 174–175; Hal Hil and Sisira 
Jayasuriya, “An Inward-Looking Economy in Transition: Economic Development in Burma 
since the 1960s” (Occasional Paper No. 80, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
1986), 25.  
With the state setting prices and production targets, Myanmar private, 
cooperatives, and SOEs were not incentivized to make improvements. Consequently, 
after nearly two decades, Myanmar’s firms fell behind their global and regional 
competitors, leaving Myanmar’s economy vulnerable to trade deficits. Myanmar’s ISI 
strategy continued to protect the SOEs while creating a bias against new export ventures. 
In the early 1980s, the world market price for Myanmar’s chief exports such as teak and 
rice remained low.198 After 1983, the increase in rice production started to level off.199 
Myanmar’s rice production in 1984/85 was particularly low and as a consequence, 
Myanmar’s foreign reserves fell to about $50 million.200 
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The 1985 and 1987 demonetization (the act of removing a currency unit of its 
status as legal tender) of the kyat catalyzed the collapse of the socialist economy. During 
both instances of demonetization, U Ne Win supposedly acted without consulting his 
senior officials or the BSPP central committee.201 Demonetization served two purposes: 
to decrease money supply and limit inflation and to weaken those who held large 
amounts of currency.202 In line with the latter purpose, some scholars argued that the 
1985 demonetization was meant to target the hmaung-kho or illegal traders, but many of 
these black-market merchants evaded the state control measures through a loophole in the 
demonetization policy.203 The 1987 demonetization was a second attempt to target the 
hmaung-kho.204 Another explanation was that the demonetization was an attempt to 
achieve “a more sensible balance between money output and prices.”205 The Myanmar 
public widely believed that General Ne Win’s fascination with astrology and 
numerology—especially the number nine—led to the creation of the 45- and 90-kyat 
notes.206 Regardless of the reason, the inclusion of medium-size 35- and 25-kyat notes 
(in addition to the 75-kyat note) in the demonetization and the absence of the option to 
trade the demonetized notes for new notes in different denominations or of other forms of 
tender made the 1987 demonetization extremely unpopular since people’s savings were 
wiped out overnight.207 The demonetization exacerbated the widespread economic 
hardship felt by the majority of the population.  
What would become known as the 8888 (8 August 1988) uprising was ignited by 
a seemingly irrelevant squabble between several youths over music played in a 
teahouse.208 Regardless of how the 8888 uprising materialized, the event was a 
culmination of societal grievances that included more than two decades of economic 
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failure. The continued downward spiral of rice exports (and overall export earnings), 
imports, savings, and investments; the constant shortages of goods and rationing; and the 
expansion of the black market economy had pointed to a crumbling economy.209 The 
aggregate negative effect of centralization, nationalization, and poor management of the 
economy came to an apex in 1988.210 The uprising also signified a turning point in 
Myanmar’s political economy. General Ne Win was replaced by a new military junta—
the SLORC—the new leadership that officially changed Myanmar’s economic trajectory 
from that of socialism to a liberalized market economy.  
D. MYANMAR AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE MODEL 
Myanmar’s road toward socialism diverged from the successful developmental 
state model adopted by many of its East and Southeast Asian neighbors. Centralized 
decision-making associated with socialism’s planned economic system insulated 
Myanmar’s economy from market incentives. As a result, the development of 
fundamental developmental state institutions, such as cooperative norms between the 
public and private sectors, was hindered or obstructed. This section discusses Myanmar’s 
deviation from the developmental state model in terms of the nature of state intervention, 
the character of the bureaucracy, human capital investment, and macroeconomic policy.  
1. State Intervention  
The emergence of the developmental state is predicated on the existence of 
“developmentally oriented” elites who are motivated by “the desire to break out of the 
stagnation of dependency and underdevelopment.”211 These elites turned to the market 
mechanism to accomplish their goal in the recognition that “socialist displacement of the 
market threatens its goals by generating bureaucratism, corruption, loss of incentives and 
an inefficient allocation of resources.”212Assuming that the Myanmar military 
government with its military elites would prefer to rule over a prosperous country rather 
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than a bankrupt one is not a stretch—yet, while the developmental state turns to the 
market, Myanmar’s government turned to socialism.  
A plausible explanation behind General Ne Win’s pursuit of socialism relates to 
his personal experience. With the background of an oppressive colonial experience, the 
communal ownership principles advocated by socialism had a strong appeal to General 
Ne Win and other Myanmar nationalist leaders who were fighting for independence. 
After independence, the struggle and consequent failure of the U Nu parliamentary 
government to resolve ethnic differences that threatened to disintegrate the union gave 
added appeal to the centralization aspects of socialism. General Ne Win’s commitment to 
socialism was likely to stem from the culmination of these factors in addition to his own 
experience leading the Tatmadaw. In the 1940s and the 1950s, the Tatmadaw too 
experienced its share of mutinies and rebellions. To General Ne Win, the survival and 
emergence of the Tatmadaw as a disciplined national institution in the 1960s provided the 
blueprint for unifying a group of people under an ideology. Since the military’s 
organizational culture (strong hierarchy, discipline, order, commitment, uniformity, and 
sacrifice) drew many parallels with socialism, General Ne Win’s commitment to 
socialism strengthened. Arguably, in General Win’s eyes, given the political situation in 
1962, the fractionalization and disintegration of the union was a more pressing problem 
than bureaucratic inefficiency.  
On the surface, Myanmar’s government during the socialist period fit the concept 
of “soft authoritarianism,” often associated with the developmental state.213 When 
General Ne Win launched the 1962 coup, he was the head of the most legitimate and 
organized institution in Myanmar. The only political entity that had the power to contest 
the legitimacy of the coup was the elected U Nu government. As part of the coup, 
General Ne Win dissolved and disbanded Myanmar’s unicameral parliament and had 
premier U Nu, his cabinet, and several parliament members arrested.214 From 1962 to 
1974, Myanmar was an authoritarian state under General Ne Win and the RC.  
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Yet Myanmar’s authoritarian regime lacked a key characteristic of the 
developmental state model’s soft authoritarian government: the ability to provide a stable 
environment that reduced risk for business investment. From 1974 to the end of 
socialism, Myanmar was a one-party socialist state dominated by the BSPP cadre. 
Although the BSPP had centralized political power, insurgencies were an everyday 
occurrence outside the central region. Myanmar’s border regions stayed insecure, with 
frequent illegal crossings between the Myanmar–Chinese and the Myanmar–Thai 
borders. Although the Tatmadaw-dominated BSPP had political control, the Tatmadaw 
did not have full territorial control, and security remained a contentious issue.  
The regime also fell short in terms of key economic characteristics associated 
with the developmental state. Government intervention makes the economy susceptible to 
rent-seeking problems. State intervention distorts the market mechanism by providing 
advantages to interest groups and creating rent values or returns that are higher than those 
achieved through competition.215 The developmental state governments avoided 
inefficiencies of rent-seeking behaviors by introducing polices that fostered competition 
among the private sector for access to limited rent-seeking advantages. By creating 
contests for entry into protected status and limiting the terms of protection, 
developmental state governments provided incentives for participants to improve their 
capabilities rather than through patronage, bribery, or lobbying.216  
Socialist Myanmar did not have incentives for state-owned firms or cooperatives 
to compete for government protection. Additionally, the Myanmar’s government did not 
place limits on the length of the time the SOE and cooperatives would enjoy government 
protection. The East Asian developmental states exercised strong control over rent-
seeking activities along with strong control over social interest groups such as ethnic 
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groups or wealthy families.217 The situation for Myanmar after the 1962 coup was the 
opposite. Since the BSPP relied on the Tatmadaw for its core cadre, the party was tied to 
the interest of the military. The appointment of Tatmadaw commanders as ministers 
further entrenched the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s political economy. The Tatmadaw 
members did not need to compete for rent-seeking advantages in post-coup Myanmar; 
they were given these favors as routine practice.  
2. Technocrats and Economic Bureaucracy  
The developmental state also relies on a meritocratic bureaucracy, with core 
economic policy decisions being made by technocratic elites insulated from political 
demands. When General Ne Win came into power, it was expected that some senior 
military officers would be posted as ministers. General Ne Win went beyond this 
expectation and replaced even the most experienced upper-level civilians with military 
officers with little to no experience.218 As a consequence, policy decisions were either 
rashly made or passed up the chain. Additionally, in the tradition of rotating officers 
between the field and Rangoon, officers who gained enough experience in the capital 
were moved elsewhere and replaced by inexperienced officers.219 The unintended side 
effect of this practice was the creation of new norms within Myanmar’s civilian 
appointments system. The perception that the military preferred loyalty rather than ability 
started to spread among the civil servants. The few trusted and capable civilians stopped 
thinking and “behaved much like their military counterparts.”220 Increasingly, 
administrative decisions started to be made based on personal favors rather than on 
efficiency. In Myanmar’s bureaucracy, the direct appointment of military officers in 
ministerial positions and the practice of rotating officers created new norms that 
incentivized personal relationships rather than merit or efficiency.  
Under the BSPP, Myanmar’s economic bureaucracy was expanded to fulfill the 
task of executing a planned economy. The new bureaucracy was staffed with Tatmadaw 
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members holding ministerial positions with a new generation of Soviet- or Eastern 
Europe-educated people under the supervision of senior bureaucrats who weathered the 
coup by pledging new allegiance to the RC.221 Although the economic bureaucracy may 
have grown in size, its authority and competence in managing the economy remained 
diminished—an indication that the expansion was the result of the growth of the BSPP’s 
political power rather than a move toward economic development.222 Since Myanmar’s 
technocrats were placed under leaders who swore loyalty to Myanmar’s only political 
party, the technocrats’ incentives to perform became tied to political connections and the 
whims of the BSPP. Additionally, the centralization of the country’s decision-making 
authority (with General Ne Win, the RC, and later the BSPP senior cadre) grew to be an 
institution in and of itself. The monopolization of state power and structural rigidity bred 
complacency and passivity that served to drain innovation and outward thinking. In 
contrast, the developmental state governments shielded their technocrats from political 
repercussions and incentivized them to use their authority to plan and execute industrial 
policies toward the goal of development. Myanmar’s version of the state’s involvement 
in the economy was thus far removed from the developmental state. 
3. Getting the Fundamentals Right  
The successes of the East Asian developmental states included the development 
of policies that “encourage macroeconomic stability, high investment in human capital, 
stable and secure financial systems, limited price distortions, and openness to foreign 
technology and agriculture development.”223 Before the 1962 coup, Myanmar’s stage of 
underdevelopment was comparable to that of Indonesia.224 The transformation of 
Myanmar into a one-party Socialist state meant that “getting the fundamentals right” 
would elude the Myanmar’s government for more than twenty-five years.  
The socialist military government seemed to constantly get the fundamentals 
wrong. The three demonetizing policies in 1964, 1985, and 1987 created civil unrest and 
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destroyed the population’s trust in the currency. Through nationalization of education, 
Myanmar’s government boasted doubling the number of primary schools from 1962 to 
1987 and tripling the number of primary school teachers—yet the quality of education 
did not improve as student-staff ratios declined and poor salaries hampered teacher 
motivation.225 The decline in the quality of education also applied at the university 
level.226 The enforcement of Burmese as the instruction language created a shortage of 
textbooks as English was the standard language. Along with the government’s policy of 
rejecting scholarships from Western democratic countries, English proficiency declined, 
and higher education professors left Myanmar, leaving a vacuum in higher learning 
curricula.  
Additionally, Myanmar’s government did not enact an aggressive policy to 
promote savings and investment. In the 1970s and 1980s, Myanmar was saving and 
investing around 15 percent of its GDP, while South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong (or newly industrialized countries) were saving and investing at twice that 
rate.227 While Japan had the postal savings system and Singapore had the Central 
Provident Fund, Myanmar’s government did not enact any major programs to encourage 
savings. The low rates of savings and investment also point to the underdevelopment of 
Myanmar’s financial sector.228  
Because of the self-reliance policy, the Myanmar’s government closed the 
country and significantly decreased the amount of foreign aid, technical assistance, and 
loans (until a shift in policy in 1974). The government’s investment in agricultural 
development was low. The government’s policy of maintaining stable consumer prices by 
keeping agricultural product prices low also hurt production incentives, which resulted in 
the decline of the sector.229  
                                                 
225 Myat Thein, Economic Development, 115. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid., 70; South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong are all considered Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NIC).  
228 Ibid., 71. 
229 Ibid., 88. 
 53 
The stark differences between the developmental state model and Myanmar’s 
political economy accounted for the near-bankrupt state of the Myanmar’s economy in 
the late 1980s. From 1962 onward, the inward-looking, self-sufficient mantra preached 
by General Ne Win and the highly centralized decision-making norms had placed self-
imposed constraints on the possibility of reforms. As Myanmar’s neighbor Thailand grew 
and expanded its economy, Myanmar’s economy was on the verge of imploding.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the socialist state mechanism centered on the party, the state, 
and the military. These three institutions “shared a common ethos in their military 
heritage.”230 The party relied on military support to meet its goal via controlling state 
functions and in return absorbed the military in its structure. The party-state-military 
trinity created an environment in which the party and military politics dominated all 
aspects of state economic and social policy.231 The influence of the Tatmadaw on the 
political and economic trajectory of Myanmar during the socialist period is undeniable.  
The colonial experience shaped the perceptions of the people of Myanmar and 
those of the Tatmadaw leadership. The resentment toward the exploitative colonial 
economic system that was synonymous with an outward-looking market strategy steered 
Myanmar’s leaders, including the Tatmadaw’s General Ne Win, toward socialism. The 
early Myanmar’s government’s failure to resolve factionalism provided the Tatmadaw 
with an opportunity to rule as a legitimate organization. After the return and another 
failure of the civilian government to reconcile political differences, political space in 
Myanmar was open to the military to unify the country.  
Since General Ne Win was the main actor in the shaping of Myanmar’s socialist 
political economy, his military training and involvement in the independence movement 
were instrumental in the formulation of the BWS and the creation of the BSPP as a 
political vehicle for reform. The Tatmadaw was instrumental in promulgating socialist 
economic politics because it was the insurer of the BSPP’s political control. The 
Tatmadaw’s transformation of Myanmar’s mixed economy into a purely socialist system 
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in 1962 included the introduction of rent-seeking norms into Myanmar’s bureaucracy, 
creating a system where civilian and military bureaucracies are incentivized by personal 
relationships rather than by merit or efficiency. Numerous personal purges within the 
Tatmadaw reinforced the placement of loyalty over job performance or innovation. As 
the state economic mechanism grew through nationalization of private sectors and the 
expansion of SOE, rent-seeking norms permeated Myanmar’s political economy.  
The failures of the BWS were many. On the eve of independence, Myanmar lacked 
the necessary pool of professionals (such as doctors, engineers, and high-level civil 
servants) to capably manage the country’s economy and government.232 Compounded with 
U Nu’s policy goal of removing foreign interests from Myanmar’s economy and the 
exodus of Indian merchants and foreign businesses after the promulgation of BWS, 
Myanmar in the mid-1960s was left with little business expertise and private capital.233 
Also, the BWS was an economic strategy that relied heavily on a government capable of 
making sound economic decisions based on good knowledge of micro- and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Myanmar had little state capacity to perform the functions 
required to execute the BWS’s strategy—and the economy steadily declined.234  
In the remote hill regions far from the reach of the centralized state and SOEs, the 
ethnic insurgency incentivized the illegal trade in the border areas. Insurgents, cut off 
from Myanmar’s planned economy, resorted to financing their operations through 
informal markets such as smuggling activities or the sale of drugs.235 The failures of the 
military government to quiet the insurgency and manage the social economic system 
paved the path for the development of a dual economy: an official socialist economy and 
a black market economy. Toward the end of the socialism period, the importance of 
socioeconomic incentives as a tool in the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency tactics, along 
with other domestic political developments, led the military government to embrace 
political economic changes toward market liberalism.  
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IV.  MARKET LIBERALIZATION PERIOD (1988–2010) 
This chapter traces the trajectory of Myanmar’s political economy during the 
market liberalization period. The first section captures the political reform under the 
SLORC and later the SPDC. The second section elaborates on Myanmar’s economic 
reforms during the country’s transition from socialism to capitalism. The third section 
compares Myanmar’s political economy during the market liberalization period with that 
of the developmental state model.  
A. POLITICAL CHANGES FROM 1988–2010 
The political unrest in 1988 provided a catalyst for changes in Myanmar’s 
political economy. Although the Tatmadaw continued to hold a monopoly of force, 
decades of economic underdevelopment and repression had hurt the regime’s ability to 
unilaterally exercise violence and coercion. The size and scale of the 1988 protest were 
unprecedented, and to the junta, the threat of the disintegration of the union was 
immediate. Maintaining the legitimacy to rule and internal security were the primary 
factors that compelled the regime to make drastic political moves. The resignation of 
General Ne Win, the end of the Socialist Party, the introduction of pluralism (and the 
return to military rule), and the first relatively free general election in 1990 were designed 
to placate the population. While the passage of the 2008 constitutions and the continued 
state monopolization of lucrative economic sectors (despite market liberalization 
announcement) represented the junta’s top-down approach to institutionalize the 
Tatmadaw interest in politics and the economy.  
Transitioning to capitalism had a special implication on the Tatmadaw. Market 
liberalization freed the Tatmadaw from the responsibilities of maintaining the socialist 
distribution mechanism and offered new opportunities for the military elites and their 
families to legally collaborate with foreign and domestic firms.236 Upon the official end 
of socialism in 1989, Tatmadaw regional commanders became responsible for raising 
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funds for the repair and maintenance of state-owned factories in their regions.237 To 
compensate for inflation, local and regional Tatmadaw units started to engage in business 
activities to earn income for troop welfare.238 As these business activities spread, 
corruption worsened and many military officers became unusually wealthy. With this 
head start, the military elites secured economic interests that would later serve as a 
legitimate foundation to fund their political aspirations.  
Starting in 1989/90, the Tatmadaw intensified its attempt to quell the ethnic civil 
war. The withdrawal of Chinese support of the CPB in March 1989 provided an 
opportunity for the Tatmadaw to move forward with negotiations with several groups. 
The initial ceasefire agreements, such as one with the Communist Wa insurgents, were 
reached as early as the autumn of 1989. Although the terms of the ceasefires allowed the 
insurgents to keep their weapons and some autonomy over the areas they controlled, the 
ceasefires improved the overall Tatmadaw position by enabling the military to conserve 
and rechannel resources to more troublesome areas.239  
Throughout the market liberalization period, the SLORC/SPDC used its control of 
the legislature to pass laws that perpetuated the junta’s authority, legitimated the 
Tatmadaw’s status, and continued to repress Myanmar’s society. In 1988, the Law 
Safeguarding the State from Danger of Destructionist Elements was amended, and the 
period of detention without trial increased from 180 days to five years.240 Politically, the 
Tatmadaw continued to use nationalism rhetoric to shield its dereliction of the people’s 
will, divert attention from lackluster economic development, and justify its policies 
toward the insurgency. The fall of the BSPP and the CPB, coupled with the accidental 
elevation of Aung San Suu Kyi as a new nucleus of political power, shaped Myanmar 
politics into a trifecta of the NLD, the Tatmadaw, and the ethnic groups.241 Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s status as a Nobel Laureate opened a dialog for democratic change and garnered 
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international attention to the junta’s human rights abuses and Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
prolonged house arrest. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, the United States and its 
allies’ attempts to use sanctions to bargain for Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom and to 
change the regime’s oppressive ways were broadly ineffective since Myanmar largely 
traded with its neighbors and regional partners. The violent crackdown of the 2007 
Saffron Rebellion was proof of the regime’s continued willingness to exercise its 
monopoly of force.  
In 2008, a national referendum passed a new version of Myanmar’s constitution. 
Many scholars consider the validity of the 2008 constitution questionable since the 
government has not provided a logical explanation for how so many voters could cast 
their ballots on 10 May 2008 despite massive flooding and infrastructure damage 
inflicted by Cyclone Nargis’s landfall only eight days earlier.242 A notable feature of the 
2008 constitution was a provision that reserved a quarter of the seats in the lower and 
upper houses of representative for military appointees.243 Since amending the 
constitution requires a supermajority of 75 percent of all representatives, the Tatmadaw’s 
interests would always be represented in the highest levels of Myanmar’s government, so 
the longevity of the Tatmadaw was virtually guaranteed.244  
Approaching 2010, the government finally had the opportunity to address the 
democracy question. The ceasefire agreement signed with several insurgent groups in the 
1990s allowed the Tatmadaw to conserve some military resources. Legalization of border 
trade and the free-trade agreement with the ASEAN increased tax revenue and the flow 
of goods and capital into Myanmar. Newly found offshore gas discoveries in 1998 and 
2000 meant a comfortable stream of revenue for years to come. For decades, military-
associated trade conglomerates benefited from their monopoly and secured their positions 
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in the marketplace. Free trade would allow theses conglomerates to benefit from their 
economy-of-scale advantage and superior market position.  
Other scholars point to the increased influence of China as the motivation for the 
regime’s move toward economic independence.245 Over the years, Chinese interests and 
investments in Myanmar have grown to include a gas pipeline and start of the Myitsone 
Dame construction.246 Regardless of what political party was in charge, the idea of 
another nation’s extracting from Myanmar called into question the ability of the 
government to maintain sovereignty. So the perception of China extracting from 
Myanmar endangered the Tatmadaw’s legitimacy as the protector of the country. 
Diversifying Myanmar’s strategic trade option through market liberalization would lessen 
the dependence on China.  
B. THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSITIONING TO  CAPITALISM  
Signs of Myanmar’s economic transition arguably materialized before the 1988 
unrest. In 1987, the government legalized cross-border trade and lifted some agricultural 
restrictions, such as the prohibition of farmers’ selling their crops at market prices.247 
The Tatmadaw leadership did, to a degree, welcome Myanmar’s placement on the UN’s 
least developed countries list in 1987, since doing so meant access to more loans and aid. 
To the public, being on this list was a national embarrassment.248 Coupled with a 
persistent shortage of essential goods, the expanding black market, and inflation, the 
least-developed status added to the stack of evidence pointing to the Tatmadaw’s 
lackluster economic management.  
Entering 1990, Myanmar’s economic landscape was grim. The country’s fiscal 
and monetary performance showed that Myanmar’s financial sector in the 1990s was 
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“less developed in many aspects” when compared with the pre-Ne Win years.249 The 
overvalued foreign exchange restrained imports of essential products for both the private 
and the state-owned manufacturing sectors.250 The economic reforms in the mid-1970s 
and the increase in external borrowing gave lifelines to the SOEs; but persistent poor 
management of the SOEs had caused the state to accumulate large deficits 
(approximately 7 to 8 percent from 1983 to 1986) that became the leading source of 
economic imbalances.251 The regime’s intervention in the rice industry (Myanmar’s 
leading export commodity) during the socialist years had destroyed the farmers’ 
incentives to increase production or improve efficiency.252 Although agriculture was 
Myanmar’s largest GDP-earning sector, the sector had been underinvested and 
underproductive for decades.  
Under socialism, private enterprises were depleted of raw materials and capital 
and limited in their access to the external market. As a result, private firms in Myanmar 
remained small, and they largely traded among themselves.253 The 1977 Private 
Enterprise Law was an attempt by the government to provide some security to private 
firms via a registration mechanism and security in purchasing inputs.254 But persistent 
shortages in the government distribution system turned private firms to the black market 
for raw material. With high uncertainty and a constant fluctuation of the prices of inputs 
in the black market, Myanmar private-sector development was insignificant prior to 
1988.  
In 1989, the SLORC formally announced that the government was liberalizing its 
economy “for the allocation of resources and distribution of goods and services, [to] 
encourage private investment and entrepreneurial activities at home, and [to] open the 
economy to foreign direct investment and to promote exports.”255 Myanmar continued to 
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face daunting challenges in transitioning to a capitalist economy. The government needed 
to achieve macroeconomic stabilization (control of inflation), liberalize prices, privatize 
SOEs, and create new structure for private firms and market activity.256  
a. Macroeconomic Stability and Price Liberalization 
In the two months after the SLORC assumed leadership, the junta made sweeping 
reforms. The government liberalized the import-export trade and ended planned 
procurement of rice and eight other crops.257 By January 1989, the regime reopened its 
border trade with China, resumed acceptance of foreign tourists, and passed the Foreign 
Investment Law (FIL).258 Immediately after the government lifted its control over prices 
and production, inflation rates soared.  
Several factors contributed to inflation following market liberalization. First, 
under socialism, basic commodities prices were kept artificially low by the government 
to appease the population and prevent revolts. When the control mechanisms were lifted, 
prices returned to their higher market rates. Second, Myanmar had been printing money 
to pay for its debts. This practice caused inflation since more money was in circulation 
than the amount of goods available for purchase. Third, the production of many 
consumables, such as beef, lagged behind population growth. The shortages of 
commodities in the market also contributed to inflation.259 Fourth, inflation depreciated 
the kyat and raised the price of imports. Once imports became more expensive, 
production that relied on imports fell. With less goods being produced, prices increased. 
The consumer price index for Myanmar in the ten years following market liberalization is 
provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Consumer Price Index and Market Rate of US$ 
(1987–2000) 
Fiscal Year CPI (1986 base year) 
Market Rate of 
US$ (in kyat) 
1987/88 126.53 30 
1988/89 155.00 42 
1989/90 191.73 50 
1990/91 233.73 58 
1991/92 301.80 84 
1992/93 369.09 99 
1993/94 492.99 120 
1994/95 603.66 113 
1995/96 735.51 117 
1996/97 882.81 149 
1997/98 1182.10 222 
1998/99 1762.22 327 
1999/2000 1963.47 344 
Adapted from Myat Thein, Economic Development, 149.  
Macroeconomic stability is tied to the exchange rate. For more than twenty years, 
the kyat was pegged to the IMF’s special drawing right that was around 6 kyat per U.S. 
dollar. The parallel (black market or unofficial) exchange rate varied widely (from 120 
kyat to 1,300 kyat per U.S. dollar in 2007).260 Among other countries that functioned 
with parallel exchange rates, Myanmar was the worst case in terms of the disparity 
between the official and the parallel exchange rates.261  
From 1988 to 2010, the government maintained tight control on foreign exchange. 
In Myanmar, export earnings in foreign currency had to be deposited in one of two state 
banks. In 1990, the government initiated a tax on export revenue and policy changes that 
allowed exporters to keep or use their foreign-currency earnings for their imports.262 This 
policy resulted in the separation of foreign exchange income earned via private exports 
and that earned by the state. Private businesses worked exclusively with the parallel 
exchange rate while the state used the official rate. In this arrangement, the overvalued 
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official exchange rate did not deter exports.263 As the parallel exchange rate fluctuated 
independently of the official rate, the large differences between the official and the 
parallel exchange rates had not been a major factor in influencing private-sector 
prices.264 Instead, inflation and depreciation of the kyat were due largely to the 
government’s practice of monetizing its fiscal deficit.  
After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Myanmar’s government tightened control 
on imports. To secure import licensing, importers must have sufficient export earnings in 
foreign currency deposits (FCD).265 In March 1998, the government revoked foreign 
exchange licenses held by private banks. Also, the government started to classify goods 
into essential and nonessential categories and mandated that importers of essential goods 
make up to 60 percent (later increased to 80 percent) of the import value.266 To the end of 
2010, no formal channel for private exporters and importers to exchange foreign earnings 
into kyat existed.267 Private businesses had to work with informal brokers, risking fraud 
and scams. Government policies and the lack of institutions to facilitate foreign exchange 
increased the transaction costs of import and export trade, which hampered the growth of 
the private sector.  
b. Transitioning SOEs and Creating New Structures for Private
Enterprises
Myanmar’s time-phased approach to the transition to capitalism had many 
institutional and structural challenges. Myanmar faced a proliferation of informal 
institutions that the country had cultivated during the socialist era. Widespread corruption 
and the reliance on patronage undermined the government’s role in creating new 
institutions to facilitate fair competition.268 The proliferation of the black market also 
counteracted the government’s credibility and its effort to create formal institutions.269 
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By magnifying the perception that economic policies taxed the general population while 
those who evaded the law profited, the black market directly challenged the legitimacy of 
Myanmar’s market institutions.  
In 1995, Myanmar’s government formalized the privatization process by creating 
the Privatization Commission with the purpose of coordinating and supervising the 
transfer of SOEs to private firms.270 The commission had very little success. Many 
factors made the SOEs unattractive to private investors. First, since the SOEs were failing 
and overvalued, they were not good investments.271 The government’s mandate that the 
new owners maintain existing staff meant that the introduction of new management 
would be difficult.272 Financing and acquiring an SOE was problematic because of the 
lack of capital in the market and the underdeveloped banking sector.273 As a result, 
privatization of SOEs proceeded at a painstakingly slow pace.  
Although the end of socialism was announced, many SOEs stayed under state 
control, such as Myanmar’s oil and gas sector.274 Under state protection, the ways oil and 
gas revenues entered the country or were managed remained undisclosed to the public. 
There have been speculations that the revenues were disbursed to third-party foreign 
accounts for the purchases of military equipment and payments to sustain the lavish 
lifestyles of senior Tatmadaw commanders.275 With vetted personal interests, it is 
unlikely that highly profitable SOEs will be privatized in the near future.  
The privatization of small to medium businesses held more promise. After the 
government liberalized the export and import trade, the number of private import/export 
traders increased from 986 at the end of 1989 to 7,325 by the end of 1994.276 The 1987 
modification of the 1947 Transfer of Immovable Property Restriction Act made space for 
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private businesses to obtain a thirty-year lease from the government (with ten-year 
incremental extensions).277 The limitation placed on the activities of the Myanmar Union 
of Chamber of Commerce and Industries during the socialist era was lifted in 1989.278 
Where the Tatmadaw had less to benefit (such as in small- to medium-scale businesses), 
state intervention eased.  
Still, expansion of the private sector was hindered by many factors. First, 
government exchange policy and macroeconomic policies constrained foreign exchange 
operations for private enterprises. Second, despite tax exemptions, private-sector taxes 
were high, representing a large expense for entrepreneurs and giving competing SOEs an 
advantage. Third, although infrastructure in Myanmar had improved, many problems 
remained. A 2010 survey found that the availability of electricity continued to be an 
issue. Fourth, the persistent lack of confidence in the legal system and the enforcement of 
contracts bled to the financial sector. Weak supervision of Myanmar’s banking sector (as 
evidenced by the 2003 banking crisis) hampered the development of the financial 
market.279 Without a robust financial market to facilitate movement of capital, 
accelerated private-sector growth is unlikely.  
2. Foreign Investment and Banking Reforms  
In 1988, the Myanmar’s government passed the FIL, making foreign investment 
possible in the sectors that required large sums of investment and in sectors that could 
generate foreign exchange earnings for the state.280 To manage the new investments, the 
FIL created the Myanmar Investment Commission with the authority to approve 
proposals and grant tax relief along with other exemptions, such as accelerated equipment 
depreciation. Despite the incentives created by the FIL, other factors discouraged foreign 
investments. First, all foreign earnings would have to be converted to kyat at the 
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extremely overvalued official rate of exchange (up to sixty times the market rate).281 
Second, although Myanmar had plenty of cheap labor, skilled labor and professional 
services were not as abundant. Years of closures of the University of Rangoon and the 
abandonment of English and other foreign language education during the socialist years 
hurt worker skills and education. Third, infrastructure problems such as the availability of 
electricity and a high capacity of port and transport capability posed additional challenges 
to operating a business in Myanmar.282 Last, Myanmar’s bureaucracy was riddled with 
inefficiencies and arbitrary policy making.283 The lack of normalized bureaucratic 
processes and procedures became sources of uncertainty and risks for business ventures.  
Although Myanmar had shortcomings, foreign direct investments (FDI) into the 
country more than quintupled from 1990 to 2010 (see Figure 1). However, these 
investments were small compared to inflows to Thailand. Most of the FDI was directed to 
the natural resource extraction sector. For example, nearly $450 million of FDI in 1989/
90 reflected ten new oil exploration projects.284 The amount of foreign investment 
decreased sharply from 1992 to 1995 due to the SLORC’s refusal to transfer power to the 
NLD after the 1990 election. After 1995, FDI steadily flowed in Myanmar. Starting in 
2007, the amount increased dramatically, reaching the one–billion-dollar mark in 2009.  
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Figure 1.  Myanmar vs. Thailand Foreign Direct Investment, 
Net Flows in Current U.S. Dollars 
 
Adapted from “Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (Balance of Payments, Current US$),” 
The World Bank, accessed 1 February 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?page=1  
Myanmar’s banking reforms began with the 1990 Financial Institutions of 
Myanmar Law (FIML), which legalized private banks. Myanmar’s government licensed 
the first private bank in 1992. The ease of services offered by private banks contrasted to 
that of state banks helped the sector grow.285 By 1998, the total deposits held in private 
banking institutions exceeded those held in state banks.286  
Establishing sound financial institutions to manage the increasing flow of capital 
due to market liberalization proved to be a daunting task for the SLORC. The stability 
and growth of the financial sector required, at minimum, a defined role of the central 
bank, competition in the banking system, and strong institutions to regulate and supervise 
new banks to reduce depositors’ risk.287 To create a well-functioning stock and bond 
market, Myanmar would need strict enforcement of exchanges and market institutions 
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that defined property rights.288 Until such institutions become a reality, realizing a 
financial market will remain beyond the government’s reach. 
Ten years after the FIML was passed, five large banks dominated Myanmar’s 
banking industry.289 Although these banks were private, the government set the ceiling on 
interest rates for loans and deposits.290 Despite this limitation, the banking industry grew. 
Entering 2001, almost two-thirds of savings in Myanmar resided in private banks.291 In late 
2002, several private finance companies revealed that they had been running Ponzi 
schemes that made high-interest payments to existing members while sourcing these 
payments from new members’ deposits.292 When the number of new recruits slowed and 
eventually dropped to zero, the scheme fell apart, robbing the participants of their 
investments and savings. The failure of these scheming private finance companies resulted 
in the public’s loss of confidence in banks. Even with the government-imposed maximum 
withdrawal of one million kyat per account per week, the flood of bank customers 
withdrawing their deposits created a shortage of kyat in the economy. Banks ran out of 
notes to meet the demands of their customers and started to indiscriminately recall loans 
without regard for the business’s or individual’s ability to repay them.293 Employers 
became short of cash to pay their employees, and the crisis ballooned.  
In terms of domestic savings, Myanmar made almost no improvements during the 
market liberalization period (see Table 3). Although FDI and loans are viable avenues 
whereby the state can derive some of its revenue, the surest way to sustain economic 
growth is by mobilizing domestic resources.294 Two leading factors contributed to the 
low rate of savings in Myanmar. First, inflation after market liberalization made it more 
difficult for households to increase their savings. Second, the overvalued exchange rates 
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and the low bank interest rates provided disincentives to depositing savings in banks. The 
combination of these two factors amounted to a lack of formal economic institutions to 
translate savings into productive economic investment.  
Table 3. Gross Domestic Savings as Percent of GDP (1992–2000) 
Fiscal Year Myanmar Thailand Singapore Republic of Korea 
1992/93 12.8 35.2 45.6 35.2 
1993/94 11.4 35.6 46.3 35.4 
1994/95 11.7 36.0 48.8 36.5 
1995/96 13.4 33.6 51.0 36.8 
1996/97 14.0 33.7 51.2 35.2 
1997/98 14.6 31.0 51.8 34.5 
1998/99 -- 31.4 50.0 34.9 
1999/2000 -- 32.0 50.0 33.9 
2000/01 -- 30.7 47.2 35.0 
2001/02 11.5 29.3 44.0 33.1 
2002/03 10.2 29.1 43.1 32.4 
2003/04 11.0 30.2 45.2 34.0 
2004/05 12.1 30.2 49.5 35.9 
2005/06 -- 29.4 51.2 34.6 
2006/07 -- 30.3 52.2 33.5 
2007/08 -- 33.4 53.9 33.7 
2008/09 -- 30.6 51.3 33.0 
2009/10 -- 30.0 51.2 33.2 
2010/11 -- 30.9 54.3 35.2 
Adapted from “Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP),” The World Bank, accessed 1 February 
2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS.  
3. Agricultural Reforms  
Agriculture is the backbone of the Myanmar’s economy. The market 
liberalization included two basic reforms for the agricultural sector: liberalization of 
agricultural product trade and agricultural product expansion.295 The initial reform took 
place in the late 1980s when the government reduced rice procurement levels and 
permitted the farmers to sell and trade the excess.296 The compulsory delivery system 
was abolished and the farmers were free to sell to whomever (including the international 
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market) and at whatever price they chose.297 Whatever the policies were, in reality, the 
government did not allow private export of rice.298 The state continued to maintain 
ownership of all the land leaving farmers with tillage privileges and the government 
continued to enforce the procurement system for rice and other crops under the guise of 
the “crop plan.”299  
The degree of enforcement of the crop plan varied from region to region and crop 
to crop. Politically sensitive crops such as rice, cotton, and sugarcane were under closer 
supervision than less sensitive crops such as pulses.300 Since rice accounted for the 
majority of the sown area, the government linked political security to food security. The 
tightened control on paddy production; the introduction of summer paddy in the 1990s 
coupled with government investment in irrigation and increased fertilizer credit and 
diesel fuel subsidies for water pumps reflected the priority the regime placed on rice.301 
Other crops with lower political value, such as sesame, were less regulated. For these 
crops, transactions became more commercialized and domestic government procurement 
prices started to match world market prices. As the market expanded to include export 
possibilities, farmers and cultivators found profitable incentives to increase their 
efficiency. While the increase in rice output was largely due to an increase in the net 
sown area, the boom in the production of crops such as sesame and green gram was due 
to increased demand and farmer productivity (sesame productivity jumped from around 
57 tons per acre in 1988/89 to about 223 in 2010, a four-fold increase).302 The selective 
application of the market liberalization policy revealed that the profit and market 
competition are powerful production incentives, in this case, more powerful than 
government mandates.  
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Although liberalization brought an abrupt increase in prices of agricultural 
products in the late 1980s and early 1990s, rural income did not dramatically increase. 
The price of rice in 1994 was 8.7 times the 1987 price, while prices of sesame and 
peanuts increased by 2.7 times as much and the price of pegyi (Myanmar white bean) 
increased by 6.0 times as much. Since paddy constituted the majority of the land sown 
and labor, the near-stagnant increase of productivity meant the majority of agricultural 
income associated with paddy did not rise.303 The increases of prices and transition to 
capitalism did not translate to large aggregate improvements to the livelihoods of 
farmers. In 1988, fertilizers that had been under government control for decades were 
opened to private companies and foreign interests, and in the 1990s, government 
subsidies for fertilizer ended.304 The result was an increase in the cost of inputs to 
farmers. Government policy for the procurement quota for paddy was approximately 20 
percent of gross production regardless of the acreage dedicated to paddy or the paddy 
output.305 The quotas were purchased at a lower price than the black market or world 
market prices. Additionally, the government dictated planting patterns and threatened to 
revoke the farmers’ tillage privileges if they deviated from the government’s plans.306  
Despite the market liberalization announcement, the building of property-rights 
institutions in Myanmar’s largest private sector, agriculture, proceeded slowly. In 1997/
98, agriculture employed 62.7 percent of the population, a small change compared to 62.5 
percent in 1988/87.307 As late as 2010, the agricultural sector remained plagued by price 
and production control as well as export restrictions.308 Since many farmers still had no 
secure title to their land, they faced tenure issues such as sudden eviction due to land 
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grabs for large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams.309 Landless 
agricultural workers in rural areas also remained impoverished.310  
4. Myanmar’s Economic Strategy and Performance from 1988 to 2010 
After the 8888 uprising, the SLORC concentrated its efforts on ending the 
economic disruption caused by the political unrest. From 1989 to 1992, Myanmar’s 
economy slowly recovered from an equivalent of an economic stall caused by the 
political unrests in 1988. Economic policy during these short few years consisted of 
annual plans, or Stabilization Programme, that leaned toward solving the severe deficit 
and foreign exchange problems through netting FDI and liberalizing the agriculture and 
trade sectors.311 After 1992, government economic strategy consisted of a succession of 
four five-year plans that spanned from 1992/93 to 2010/11. In 1992/93, the SLORC 
executed the First Short-Term Four-Year plan (1992/93–1995/96) with a focus on 
production and export and a goal of long-term growth and economic stability.312  
The opening of the private sector and the inflow of FDI initiated in 1988/89 started 
to yield dividends in the 1990s. From 1992 to 1996, Myanmar’s GDP per capita steadily 
increased. In the last year of the plan, GDP per capita was 13,516.5 kyat (see Table 4). 
Parallel to the First Short-Term Plan, Myanmar’s government passed new Tariff, Savings 
Bank, Myanmar Hotel and Tourism, Myanmar Citizens Investment, Myanmar Mines, and 
Myanmar Insurance Laws.313 Additionally, the SLORC established four private banks, 
introduced a new savings bank law, licensed representative offices of eleven foreign banks, 
and opened a foreign exchange center.314 These developments represented the emergence 
of nascent market institutions in Myanmar’s foreign exchange sector. 
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Table 4. Myanmar GDP Per Capita in Kyat, GDP Growth  

























1985/86  1,510 n/a 171 2.9 G 2.9 
1986/87  1,466 n/a 127  -1.1 
1987/88  1,380  n/a  123  -4 
1988/89  1,200  1,940.5 111  -11.4 
1989/90 Stabilization 
Programme 
1,221 3,114.3 118  3.7* 
1990/91 1,232 3,725.9 123 2.8 G 2.8 
1991/92 1,202 4,495.6 124  2.8* 
1992/93 First Short-
Term Plan  
1,293 5,891.3 138  9.7 A 
1993/94 1,347 8,357.0 147  6.0 A  
1994/95 1,421 10,763.9 159  7.5 A 




1,559 17,379.4 183 6.4 G 6.1 A 
1997/98 1,619 24,126.3 194  5.3 A 
1998/99 1,650 33,425.6 125  6.1 A 
1999/2000 1,794 44,579.4 137 10.9 G 6.5 A 
2000/01 n/a 50,927.3 150 13.7 G 5.8 C 
2001/02 Third Short-
Term Plan 
n/a 69,390.1 156 11.3 G 5.5 C 
2002/03 n/a 107,823.4 210 12.0 G 5.0 C 
2003/04 n/a 114,983.8 200 13.8 G 4.5 C 
2004/05 n/a 167,204.8 206 13.6 F 3.2 C  




n/a 298,173.4 274 13.1 F 7.0 D 
2007/08 n/a 405,845.4 359 11.9 F 5.5 D 
2008/09 n/a 500,767.0 537 H 10.1 F 3.6 D 
2009/10 n/a 573,212.0 596 H  5.1 E 
2010/11 n/a 801,418.0 759 H  5.3 E 
Adapted from Myat Than, State Dominance, 127, 367; “Statistics For Dynamic Policy Making,” 
Asian Development Bank, accessed December 26, 2015, https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/; Mya Than 
and Myat Thein, ed., Financial Resources for Development in Myanmar: Lessons from Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 34–35; Myat Than, Economics, 131; 
Danis Hew, “Southeast Asian Economies: Toward Recovery and Deeper Integration,” Southeast 
Asian Affairs 2005, (2005): 46, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/southeast_asian_affairs/v2005/
2005.hew.pdf; Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2006–2007, 119; Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2010 (OECD Publishing) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264096004-en, 26; Asian Development Bank, Outlook 2011 
Update: Preparing for Demographic Transition (Manila, Philippines, 2011) www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/29086/adu2011.pdf; Sean Turnell, “Fundamentals of Myanmar’s 
Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective,” Asian Economic Policy Review 6, no. 1 
(2011), 137, doi:10.1111/j.1748-3131.2001.01190.x;Takashi Kurosaki, “Crop Choice, Farm 
Income, and Political Control in Myanmar,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 13, no. 2 
(2008): 180–203, doi:10.1080/13547860801923582; “Myanmar in Transition: Opportunity and 
Challenges,” Asian Development Bank, August, 2012, www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/29942/myanmar-transition.pdf.  
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After the 1990 election, the United States enthusiastically embraced the changes 
in Myanmar.316 Aung San Suu Kyi’s 1991 Nobel Prize increased her appeal in the United 
States.317 However, by the mid-1990s, the SLORC’s intention to ignore the election 
results and maintain power became clear. In protest, the United States launched its first 
batch of economic sanctions in 1995, effectively barring U.S. contribution to programs in 
Myanmar. U.S. sanctions generated no reaction in Myanmar’s economic direction as the 
government moved forward by launching its next five-year plan (1996/97–2000/01, or 
the Second Short-Term Plan).  
In 1997, the Clinton administration’s second batch of sanctions against Myanmar 
banned new U.S. investments in Myanmar and prohibited the export of financial 
services.318 In the same year, some of the biggest U.S. private companies ceased their 
operations in Myanmar. Pepsi announced its disengagement from Myanmar’s market 
effective 15 January 1997 and stopped distributing products by the end of May.319 Pepsi 
had been under pressure from human rights organizations, though the company claimed 
the reason was based on the “assessment of current U.S. foreign policy.”320 The sanctions 
had their greatest impact on Myanmar’s garment industry, but overall, they did little to 
change the junta’s policies.  
Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 with hopes of gaining economic benefits from 
the other Southeast Asian economies. But the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) created 
a large impediment to this plan. Since Myanmar did not have a developed capital market, 
the negative and contagious effects of the AFC were somewhat tempered. The greatest 
impact seemed to be the dramatic decrease in the flow of aid to Myanmar.321 Despite the 
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sanctions and the AFC, Myanmar’s economy grew from 1996 to 2001 (see Table 5), 
mainly from the discoveries of offshore natural gas fields that were reportedly valued at 
“tens of billions of dollars.”322  
Table 5. Myanmar GDP Per Capita in Kyat and Percentage Growth in 
Constant Prices  
Fiscal Year  GDP per capita in Kyat  
Growth % 
constant prices  
1988/89 1,940.5 -11.4 
1989/90 3,114.3 3.7 
1990/91 3,725.9 2.8 
1991/92 4,495.6 2.8 
1992/93 5,891.3 9.7 
1993/94 8,357.0 6.0 
1994/95 10,763.9 7.5 
1995/96 13,516.5 6.9 
1996/97 17,379.4 5.8 
1997/98 24,126.3 5.7 
1998/99 33,425.6 5.8 
1999/2000 44,579.4 10.9 
2000/01 50,927.3 13.7 
2001/02 69,390.1 11.3 
2002/03 107,823.4 12 
2003/04 144,983.8 13.8 
2004/05 167,204.8 13.6 
2005/06 221,782.8 12.2 
2006/07 298,173.4 13.1 
2007/08 405,845.4 5.5  
2008/09 500,767.0 3.6 
2009/10 801,418.0 5.1 
2010/11 923,406.0 5.3 
Adapted from “Statistics For Dynamic Policy Making,” Asian Development Bank, accessed 
December 26, 2015, https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/; Myanmar in Transition: Opportunity and 
Challenges,” Asian Development Bank, August, 2012, www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/29942/myanmar-transition.pdf; Mya Than and Myat Thein, ed., Financial 
Resources for Development in Myanmar: Lessons from Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2000), 7, 9.  
At the end of 2001, Myanmar’s government once more announced that the 
economy had exceeded the goals of the Five-Year Plan and began work on the next five-
year plan (2001/02–2005/06, or the Third Short-Term Plan).323 Whether Myanmar’s 
                                                 
322 Ibid.  
323 Tin Maung Maung Than, State Dominance, 364.  
 75 
government attained the goals set in each subsequent short-term plan is debatable. 
Fisheries production, extraction of forest products, and paddy acreage did increase; 
however, trade, rate of savings and investment, foreign aid, the 2003 banking crisis, the 
2004 batch of new U.S. sanctions, and FDI figures presented a contradiction.324 Despite 
the government-reported GDP growth, Myanmar’s per capita GDP in U.S. dollars (at the 
market exchange rate of around 900 kyat per dollar) was roughly $180 in 2003—low 
compared to global figures. Inflation continued to plague Myanmar’s economy. An 
average household expenditure in Yangon City estimated at around 2,000 kyat in 1989 
had risen to over 37,000 in 2001.325  
By the end of 2005, the private sector was improving despite obstacles imposed 
by government policies. The 1988 FIL that disadvantaged local businesses by providing 
three-year tax exemptions for foreign investors was rectified by the 1994 Myanmar 
Citizens Investment Law. By the mid-1990s, investor rights were more defined and 
economic enterprises were protected from nationalization.326 The number of registered 
business enterprises grew from 4,873 in 1991 to 39,133 in 2005.327 In 2006, Myanmar 
launched the Fourth Short-Term Plan (2006/07–2010/11). Contrary to the SLORC’s 
claim of 12.6 percent growth in 2004/05, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) assessed 
that “GDP growth in Myanmar stayed sluggish, and the junta’s estimates of robust 
growth are unrealistic.”328 The decline of agricultural sector output and other inputs such 
as power and fertilizer pointed to an actual growth rate that was much lower.329 The EIU 
estimated that for 2005/06 and 2006/07, Myanmar’s GDP growth was approximately 1.5 
and 2.2 percent respectively.330  
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When Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar in 2008, more than 77,000 people were 
killed and another 20,000 injured.331 With storm-related damages amounting to 2.7 
percent of the 2008 GDP, the cyclone wrecked the economy; GDP per capita growth 
dropped from 5.5 percent in 2007 to 3.6 percent in 2008 (see Table 5).332 Recovering 
from the disaster was difficult. Drought in the central region and lingering soil salinity 
from the flood hindered rice production.333 In December 2008, when Thailand’s trading 
prices for rice dropped more than 45 percent from the record high in April–May, 
Myanmar’s domestic rice prices remained stable.334 The lack of farm credit and the 
declined rice production due to the cyclone placed a large group of landless laborers in 
poverty. No longer able to afford rice, these laborers consumed taro and low-grade rice 
meant for animal feed.335 When demand dropped along with supply, prices remained 
stable.  
Because of its nascent financial market, the negative effect of the 2009 global 
recession was largely attenuated in Myanmar. Myanmar did experience a drop in export 
and domestic consumption since its neighboring economies and trading partners were 
deeply connected to world financial markets, but conditions were slowly improving. 
Agricultural lands were gradually rehabilitated after the cyclone. The construction of 
Naypyidaw contributed to growth. Inflation that had been higher than 20 percent was 
lowered to 8.2 percent in 2009 and 7.3 percent in 2010. Increases in the production and 
sale of natural gas were expected to continue, and demand from Thailand was expected to 
increase.  
Saying Myanmar’s attempt to liberate its economy since the late 1980s was a total 
failure would be an overstatement; the reforms yielded minor successes. The middle class 
was expanding, albeit through crony capitalism. Some of the UN and World Bank 
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development indicators, such as infant mortality, were improving. Since banks started to 
take deposits from “uncertain” origins as long as proper taxes were paid, money poured 
into the banking sector.336 The Rangoon and Mandalay housing markets boomed. With 
the Kokang Chinese, the Wa ethnic group started expanding its commercial empire: from 
owning Mitsubishi Electric’s franchise in Myanmar to selling Myanmar gin. 
Additionally, old warlord and insurgent leaders such as Lo Hsing-Han and Khun Sa 
propelled themselves into the new market.337  
None of Myanmar’s reforms between 1988 and 2010 focused exclusively on 
establishing or strengthening a legal framework of property rights or promoting fair and 
open competition. The fundamental workings of military rule during the socialist era 
remained. Even after 1988, the prevalence of informal methods to settle disputes and 
client-patron relationships persisted. The uncertainties associated with an “unpredictable” 
and “predatory” government barred long-term investments that required predictability as 
a risk reduction factor.338 The operating business norm in Myanmar continued to 
concentrate on short-term gains of the rat-race nature.  
C. MYANMAR AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE  
From 1988 to 2010, Myanmar’s economic policy started to shift toward that of the 
developmental state. More than during its socialist period, Myanmar was motivated to 
break through the malaise of underdevelopment that was exacerbated by decades of 
autarkic policies. Myanmar began to adopt some developmental state strategies such as 
shifting from ISI to export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Beyond these fundamentals, 
by the end of 2010, Myanmar was still far from resembling a developmental state.  
1. The Growth Strategy  
The core strategy of shifting from ISI to EOI enabled the developmental states to 
rapidly industrialize and grow. Post Korean War, the South Korean government placed 
tight restrictions on imports and selectively used foreign exchange and trade protection to 
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grow domestic industries.339 South Korea had a low rate of savings, and investments 
were largely funded by foreign aid.340 Korea’s shift to EOI took place under Park Chung-
hee. Since Park had the support of the army and the population, this shift was apolitical 
and driven by the need for an independent economy. Because Korea was resource poor, 
the only solution was to build industries to export manufactured goods. To build its 
industries, the government raised the interest rates to promote savings. The government 
also directly engaged the industrial sector and provided targeted subsidies to promote 
export sector growth.341 The won (Korea’s currency) was kept undervalued compared to 
the market rate to provide blanket protection to all domestic producers. When South 
Korea shifted its focus to heavy industries in the 1970s, Korea’s GDP grew. 
Myanmar attempted to follow a similar strategy. Arguably, the inward-looking 
policy was recognized as restricting growth when, in the 1970s, Myanmar started to 
accept foreign aid and loans. Myanmar became officially outward oriented after the 
SLORC abandoned socialism in 1989. Where South Korea needed to build a 
manufacturing sector to generate exports, Myanmar was resource rich, so it continued 
rely on its natural endowment to earn foreign exchange. The Korean and Taiwanese 
governments supported their domestic export entrepreneurs in the early stages of EOI by 
providing property security, financial aid, and fiscal assistance; but competition remained 
the major drive for innovation and efficiency. Although Myanmar became increasingly 
outward-looking, the government’s reliance on its natural resources assuaged the 
imperative to develop its export industries. Since the Myanmar’s government dominated 
the majority of the industrial sector, competition never became a serious motivator for 
productivity.  
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2. Technocrats and Economic Bureaucracy 
The success of the developmental states was associated with bureaucrats who 
enjoyed a degree of freedom from political capture.342 Although the country was no 
longer under General Ne Win, the bureaucracy remained plagued with ineffective 
micromanagement practices. Myanmar’s civil servants and ministers were entrenched in 
politics and concentrated their efforts in unquestioningly adhering to top-down 
instructions to the minute details.343 The economic growth during the first Four-Year 
Plan (1992/93–1995/96) masked Myanmar’s deeper institutional problems by falsely 
reinforcing the effectiveness of centralized decision making. It was a common norm in 
the government that anyone who questioned the policies or provided different ideas was 
labeled as “unpatriotic, foolish, or a saboteur.”344 Under this condition, bureaucratic 
performance continued to be motivated by personal loyalty rather than innovation.  
The developmental states politically insulated their technocrats so they could 
execute industrial policies without fear of political reprisal. From 1988 to 2010, 
Myanmar’s technocrats remained embedded in the highly politicized bureaucracy. 
Fearing the loss of rents, revenues, employment, and prestige, many ministers and senior 
civil servants resisted liberalizing the SOEs.345 Although the government created new 
bureaucracies to manage the transition to capitalism, these new bureaucracies were 
staffed by retired military officers or people who were loyal to the military. Despite 
change, the old norm of politics over pragmatism and loyalty over prudence perpetuated.  
3. Cooperation between Public and Private Sectors  
The developmental state model argues that government intervention in economics 
can result in economic growth. In South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, the developmental 
                                                 
342 Stephan M. Haggard, “Business, Politics and Policy in East and Southeast Asia,” in Behind East 
Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity ed. Henry S. Rowen (London, UK: 
Routledge, 1998), 81.  
343 Myat Thein, Economic Development, 128.  
344 Ibid.  
345 Lee Jones, “The Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 44, 
no. 1 (2014): 148–149. doi: 10.1080/00472336.2013.764143.  
 80 
structure is one of a close alliance between the state and the producer class.346 With 
developmental-oriented leaders, this structure holds the potential for action that generates 
growth.347 The socialist years transformed Myanmar’s economic structure. 
Nationalization of private enterprises eliminated the capitalist class, allied the state with 
farmers, and marginalized the working classes. Decades of shortages, economic 
stagnation, the 1987 placement on the UN’s Least Developed Nation list, and the 8888 
uprising were counterrevolutionary forces that reversed the socialism by returning 
Myanmar to state-mediated capitalism.  
Socialism had skewed the development of the cooperative relationships between 
the state and the private sector. Although the government claimed to liberalize the 
economy, it constrained private-sector growth via licensing and bureaucratic procedures. 
Small private enterprises such as restaurants and local retailers could acquire licenses 
relatively quickly; however, for lucrative businesses such as a large hotel, entrepreneurs 
had to lobby various ministers, file countless applications for permits, and pay enormous 
processing fees. While private entrepreneurs encountered difficulties, Tatmadaw-
associated (but not state-owned) Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited 
(UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) enjoyed unimpeded 
operations in banking, tourism, trade, heavy industries, gems, and commodities.348  
The developmental state model conceptualized government-business relationships 
as ongoing negotiations where the government wants investment and support and 
companies want a stable business environment.349 This notion is almost impossible to 
conceive in the context of Myanmar’s economic structure. As long as the government-
private-sector relationship was centered on personal politics, Myanmar’s business 
environment would perpetually lack the predictability necessary for long-term 
investment.350 Until the political institutions undergo changes, economic growth 
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resulting from the developmental state’s context of government-business relationships 
will elude Myanmar.  
D. CONCLUSION 
During the market liberalization period, Myanmar attempted to correct the 
economic problems caused by decades of autarkic socialist policies. The ruling elites 
responded to the 8888 uprising with short-term economic and political reforms to appease 
the masses. The lack of follow-through and long-term planning suggests that the reforms 
were not motivated entirely by development goals but included a strategy for the military 
leadership to maintain its political position. Threatened, Myanmar’s political elites 
reinforced their power base by increasing the size and strength of the Tatmadaw. Even 
though the Myanmar’s government introduced political pluralism and hosted a relatively 
fair election in 1990, democracy eluded Myanmar. The junta held a monopoly on the use 
of force that allowed it to maintain power for nearly twenty-seven more years.  
Although the government enacted many reforms during the market liberalization 
period, the economy that grew under repressive conditions was not one that promotes a 
strong middle class and progressive change.351 The number of small- and medium-size 
private enterprises had increased; however, the sectors, such as heavy industry, that 
generate large profits continued to be monopolized by a small oligarchy of elites with 
close ties of the military. Despite the end of socialism, government policies from 1998 to 
2010 remained inadequate to create institutions that foster fair market competition. Since 
Myanmar economic reform seemed to target immediate regime problems such as political 
unrest, genuine commitment to build deeper institutions, such as strengthening the rule of 
law or controlling corruption, had lower priorities.  
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
The following presents a comparison of socialist and capitalist Myanmar in order 
to build a generalization about the Myanmar political economy. The approach centers on 
using institutions as the unit of analysis to examine linkages between incentives, 
economic activities, and policy. Since understanding the dynamics of the development 
and sustainment of social, political, and economic institutions is crucial to 
comprehending the mechanisms that enabled the successes of the developmental states, 
the first section discusses the Tatmadaw, how it became a political actor, and the 
institutional shifts that occurred under its dominance. After the state of institutions 
development has been defined, the second section assesses Myanmar’s institutions in the 
context of the developmental state model.  
A. THE TATMADAW AS AN ACTOR AND AN ORGANIZATION 
From the viewpoint of the Tatmadaw as a political actor, the adaptation of 
socialism in Myanmar was a result of the dynamics between the political conditions and 
the Tatmadaw’s militaristic goals. Since the prioritization of collectivism over private 
entrepreneurship was conducive to militarization of the state, the Tatmadaw’s 
organization norms permeated the government decision-making institutions. The 
subsequent move toward capitalism was motivated by the declining legitimacy of the 
Tatmadaw to govern the state. Although an underlying security threat accompanied wide-
scale social unrest, politics was the leading factor that drove market liberalization.  
Since the development of the indigenous Myanmar officer corps was not a 
priority for Britain during colonial rule, the development of the Tatmadaw was greatly 
influenced by the politics of the Thakin movement.352 Two examples that show the link 
between politics of the Thakin movement and Tatmadaw were Aung San and General Ne 
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Win.353 The extension of the Tatmadaw’s deep connection and involvement in politics 
from the pre-independence era cemented the organization and its members as the most 
relevant political actors in independent Myanmar.  
Weak parliamentary institutions and disorganized civilian political organization in 
the 1950s created a favorable political environment for General Ne Win to launch a coup 
in 1962. After taking power, the Tatmadaw institutions started to override existing 
Myanmar political institutions.354 With the Tatmadaw under his command, General Ne 
Win exercised the military’s monopoly of force to uproot the parliamentary political 
structure and installed his vision of a one-party socialist state.355 Resistance from ethnic 
minority groups, students, and other activists was repressed with brutality. The Tatmadaw 
began supplying national leaders by reorganizing the cabinet and ministries.356 Many 
bureaucrats and civil servants of the old regime kept their jobs, but their positions and 
authority were deeply marginalized by the new leadership. Personal loyalty and 
connection to the military became requirements for advancement. Gradually, the 
importance of merit and productivity as the basis for career progression diminished. 
Under the Tatmadaw, government decision-making authority became more 
hierarchical, with seemingly minor decisions requiring the approval of the minister or 
high-ranking officers. The practice of appointing and rotating military members in 
ministerial positions significantly reduced the autonomy and authority of the 
bureaucracy. Avenues for technocrats and the academic community to influence policy 
dwindled since close personal relationships with senior military members were required 
for ideas to get heard. The creation of the BSPP from a core membership of Tatmadaw 
officers directly injected military norms and institutions into Myanmar’s changing 
political system.  
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The ability of the Tatmadaw to maintain power after 1962 reflected the military’s 
maturity as the state’s apparatus of violence. Through the use of force, the Tatmadaw 
expelled its capitalist class, eliminated foreign interests, suppressed any political 
opposition, and drove the minority groups into the peripheral areas. Without any political 
opposition to champion market-oriented policies, the Tatmadaw consolidated political 
power under General Ne Win’s authoritarian rule. As Tatmadaw officers were gaining 
political power, the military regime used socialist ideology to manipulate the masses to 
concede to the regime’s rule.357 In the manner in which formal rules increase the efficacy 
of informal constraints, the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution created a one-party 
socialist state and legitimated the political consensus that cooperating with the Tatmadaw 
and the BSPP was the only option for political survival.358 By formalizing its place in 
politics and the government, the Tatmadaw shaped Myanmar’s governance to conform to 
its organizational ideals.  
Scholars have argued that strong “ruled-base public administration and 
institutional respect for private investment and property rights” have failed to develop 
due to the “primacy of political consideration” and a state apparatus that was permeated 
with corruption and mismanagement.359 The separation of the military from the 
government enabled the military to channel individual self-interest through military 
promotions. After the Tatmadaw took over the government, this separation disappeared. 
When military leaders became political leaders, political rent-seeking behaviors became 
an avenue to fulfill self-interests. Since private investments, property rights, and market 
competition institutions were attenuated under socialism, the merging of the military into 
the government meant that military connections were crucial in the competition for 
access to resources within the state distribution network.  
At the individual level, what little incentives the Tatmadaw had to develop 
economic institutions arguably stemmed from individuals’ propensity to “truck and 
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barter.”360 Ruling a bankrupted country was not an attractive situation for the Tatmadaw 
leaders who claimed to be Myanmar’s liberators. General Ne Win’s request for economic 
options was evidence that although the organization and professional qualities of the 
Tatmadaw may have eased the takeover, the junta recognized that different qualities were 
needed to govern a state.361 The plans provided by Ne Win’s advisors included a trade-
and-export-oriented strategy and an autarkic socialist strategy.362 General Ne Win chose 
socialism because he believed the ideology was compatible with the public’s 
“philosophical outlook” and that a version of self-sufficiency would strengthen 
Myanmar’s sovereignty.363 Along with the prevailing military necessity to maintain 
security and the integrity of the union, socialism was easy for the masses to accept since 
it had been ideologically associated with the late Aung San. Politically and militarily 
motivated reasons for a centrally controlled economy overrode all other alternatives.  
The NIE framework assumes that agents are autonomous, rational actors. As each 
actor tries to maximize utility, institutions are developed from the incentives to normalize 
the exchange structure to reduce the transaction costs paid by the actors.364 In this 
context, a single-actor economy that is isolated from market exchanges has little 
incentive to develop institutions to facilitate interactions with others. This was the case 
for Myanmar during the socialist period. As the military took control over 
industrialization, opportunities for the autonomous indigenous trader and entrepreneur 
class to grow were severely limited.365 Since the development of autonomous social, 
political, and market institutions threatened the regime’s survival as well as the personal 
survival of the Tatmadaw’s leaders (especially General Ne Win), the Tatmadaw and the 
BSPP would politically benefit if they exercised the monopoly on force to suppress other 
actors.  
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Blaming bad governance as the source of Myanmar’s economic failures under 
socialism is too simplistic and too general. Political repression has the power to skew the 
economic feedback mechanism that should provide information about the actual state of 
the economy.366 Just as the Chinese Communists discovered the unpopularity of 
agricultural collectivization only after they abandoned it; similarly, the many 
vulnerabilities of the Tatmadaw’s rule, such as the true source of inflation, falling 
national revenue, and the impact of the black market economy, were hidden by the 
violent suppression of dissent.367 Compounded by the limited accurate statistics available 
to the government (none at all in the insurgent-controlled areas), nepotism, and the 
isolation of the military elites, misinformation was especially acute for Myanmar.  
Entering the 1970s, the decline of the economy after the introduction of socialism 
is indicative of the Tatmadaw’s failure to adapt and find solutions to resource-allocation 
problems. The end of colonialism, the rise of nationalism, and the ethnic factionalism 
may have led General Ne Win toward socialism as the unifying ideology, but the reasons 
General Ne Win believed military-led socialism could succeed came from his experience. 
The relatively stable economy during the Tatmadaw’s caretaker period (1958–1960) was 
arguably due not to the Tatmadaw’s leadership but to Myanmar’s vibrant private sector 
and a cadre of capable bureaucrats who had appropriate decision-making authority.368 
Socialism ushered the exodus of the Indian and Chinese capitalists and the 
marginalization of civil servants. With the old foundations gone, when the Tatmadaw put 
the same officers (who were in charge during the caretaker period) in leadership position, 
the officers could not replicate previous economic successes.  
One of the reasons the Tatmadaw could not solve market problems was related to 
the fact that military leaders were not trained to be economists or bureaucrats. To a 
greater degree of severity than other societal organizations, the military necessitates 
institutional rigidity and hierarchical structure for the sake of discipline and efficiency in 
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execution.369 When faced with market challenges, the Tatmadaw applied its institutional 
experience by changing leadership and heightening centralized decision making to reduce 
uncertainties and risks. In this fashion, the military-related institutions hampered the 
Tatmadaw’s ability to develop innovative solutions.  
Insulated under socialism, lack of exposure to the free-market economy slowed 
the ability of the Tatmadaw government to recognize the symptoms of economic 
maladies. It took more than a decade for Myanmar to initiate the first set of reforms to 
correct the deterioration of its economy under socialism. In 1973, the Tatmadaw issued 
new policies that nearly doubled the state procurement price for rice and formally 
accepted foreign aid and loans.370 This act symbolized two learning points. The first is 
the recognition that farmers were incentivized to increase productivity by profit and not 
nationalism. The second is that the decline of export earnings from rice was a symptom 
of poor policy in the management of the rice sector. A summary of the institutions 
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Table 6. Institutions Analysis of the Socialist Period (1962–1988)  
Conditions  Tatmadaw’s Incentives 
and drivers  
Methods and Means Impact on Political 
Economic Institution 










Elimination of property 
rights institutions eliminated; 
market competition reduced 
to competition for access to 
resources in socialist 
distribution system 
Lesson learned from the 
military operations to gain 
independence  
Freedom of military 
operations  
Amending old laws and 
passing new legislation, 
using the coup to remove 
the old government 
The military became 
synonymous with the rule of 
law,  
Failure of parliamentary 
institutions, weak political 
institutions, legitimacy of the 
Tatmadaw as the defender of 
the union  
National security 
(prevention of the 




authoritarian government  
Institutionalization of the 
exercise of force, repression 
of dissent created 
misinformation and 
decreased innovation  
 
The Tatmadaw’s success in 
managing the country during 
the caretaker period  
Centralized, 
hierarchical, decision-
making norms  
Creating the 
Revolutionary Council 
and appointing military 
officers in ministerial 
positions  
Military-centric and rigid 
decision norms overrode 
bureaucratic autonomy, 
preference of personal 
politics over pragmatism, 
reduced state capacity as 
military leaders replaced key 
bureaucrats and civil 
servants  
Stagnation of the socialist 
economy  
Maintaining legitimacy 
to rule the country  
Accepting foreign aid 
and loans, economic 
reforms, introduction of 
monetary incentives 
Slow shift toward market 
incentives  
 
The international environment in the 1990s was full of signs that embracing the 
market was the strategy for economic growth. Reforms in China, perestroika and glasnost 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the success of the export-oriented strategy 
of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea had the effect of “uplifting the aspirations of the 
Myanmar people and determining the decisions of their leaders.”371 Although Myanmar 
was autarkic, senior leadership were not isolated from the world. General Ne Win and 
other military members made frequent trips to Europe and other destinations. Akin to 
military professionals in other least-developed countries, the Tatmadaw officers were 
acutely aware of their nation’s backwardness through foreign contacts and their 
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involvement in internal affairs.372 The constraints of centralized decision making and the 
emphasis on unquestionable loyalty have limited the officers’ ability to address the 
deteriorating economic and political conditions around them. Economic factors alone did 
not bring an end to socialism. 
Although Tatmadaw maintained its monopoly of force, by the 1990s, its ability to 
unilaterally exercise this monopoly had declined due to many endogenous factors. 
Compared to 1988, Myanmar’s economy performed better in 1962 due to the growth 
contribution from its private sector.373 In 1962, the Tatmadaw enjoyed public approval 
from its management of the country during the caretaker period that had ended two years 
earlier. In 1988, the Tatmadaw had been fighting a costly insurgency for twenty-six 
years. The socialist economy was on the verge of bankruptcy and had become a source of 
national embarrassment. Military brutality toward civilians during the U Thant protest, 
the maltreatment of the Rohingya ethnic group, and repression of other ethnic minorities 
had decreased the Tatmadaw’s symbolic value.374 The demands of economic growth and 
modern statehood necessitated more bureaucratic power and empowered technocrats to 
manage welfare and other state functions—more so than having a military running the 
country.375 The unforeseen political rise of Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD founding, and 
pluralism provided the population with viable alternatives to the Tatmadaw for the first 
time in more than twenty-five years. The gradual shift in domestic conditions created 
incentives for change.  
Economic reforms during the socialist period were indications that the Tatmadaw 
leadership conceptualized their immediate environment in relation to the world around 
them and attempted to adapt. The inability of exogenous factors (the failure of 
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communism, Chinese economic reforms, the success of the newly industrialized 
countries, the economic growth of some Southeast Asia countries, and the security 
challenge posed by Myanmar’s growing dependence on China) to end socialism 
attributed to their inadequate value function; to the Tatmadaw, the social and political 
price for change was not worth the switch.376 However, when the 1988 civil unrest raised 
the stakes, domestic conditions along with exogenous factors created an imperative, 
either the Tatmadaw change or it will risk civil war.  
 The marketization process involved the creation of new institutions.377 For 
Myanmar, post socialist development of property rights was mostly top-down rather than 
organically developed from a response to exchange and individuals’ search for utility.378 
Under socialism, Tatmadaw leaders and well-connected elites captured the benefits of 
state property via control of the state distribution system and access to resources. This 
group of individuals was incentivized to define property rights to maintain their 
exclusivity to the benefits of the resources while limiting the opportunities for others to 
compete for access or control of the same resources. With their hold of the government, 
the Myanmar elites influenced property rights institutions by passing laws that created 
legal barriers.379 The slow pace of SOE privatization, the growth of the UMEHL and 
MEC, and the continued state monopolization of the resource extraction sector during 
market liberalization period were examples of the state-associated elites retaining 
exclusivity of resources.380 An example of top-down creation property rights was the 
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1994 Myanmar Citizens Investment Law that protected businesses from 
nationalization.381  
In an ideal setting, complex institutions are crucial to creating an environment in 
which all of the participating actors enjoy low-cost transactions through self-enforcing 
commitments to honest and open exchange behaviors.382 In reality, a substantial amount 
of resources is devoted to measuring, policing, and enforcing agreements.383 During the 
socialist era, the Tatmadaw’s control of the government meant that resources and 
institutions created to measure, police, and enforce agreements were biased toward 
furthering the Tatmadaw’s interests. Actors looking to engage in economic exchanges 
with the state or within its borders could not count on fair and open transactions. The 
belief among Myanmar’s government officials that they must grab and profit as much as 
possible while in powerful positions reflected the realities of a high-risk economic 
environment.384 Since propriety could not be expected, short-term gains tend to triumph 
over long-term ones.  
From 1988 to 2010, changing domestic conditions increased the political 
liabilities associated with exercising violence. Incentivized to conserve political capital, 
the Tatmadaw resorted to manipulating formal institutions. The trend started with the 
suspension of the 1974 Constitution, followed by numerous new laws and 
amendments.385 The capstone was the 2008 Constitution that expanded the Tatmadaw’s 
judiciary authority by giving the military-endorsed president the power to appoint 
supreme court judges.386 As the criminal justice system became institutionalized, the law 
apparatus gradually became an expression of the regime’s confidence.387 By the late 
1990s, an innocent man could expect to be illegally detained, brought to court, afforded a 
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chance to express his defiance, and jailed.388 The courts were integrated into the 
Tatmadaw-dominated government modality to the point where extrajudicial killings and 
disappearances were no longer necessary.389 Although Myanmar’s legal system had 
matured beyond vigilante justice to afford some certainty to society, it was far from 
providing adequate constraints on the elites’ self-interested behaviors.390  
The Tatmadaw countered the decline in its ability to unilaterally exercise force by 
using the continuing counterinsurgency operation to validate the military’s existence and 
to justify force modernization efforts. Although the government signed ceasefires with 
several insurgent groups in the 1990s, many others continued their operations against the 
Tatmadaw. The political unrest in 1988 caused the Tatmadaw to recall troops from the 
periphery areas to reinforce those in the capital; this action created room for the 
insurgents to regroup, resupply, or launch counterattacks. The Tatmadaw commanders 
remedied this weakness by modernizing and expanding the Tatmadaw. From a force of 
fewer than 200,000 in 1988, the Tatmadaw numbers grew to 320,000 in 1995.391 By 
2010, Myanmar’s arms inventory included modern battle tanks, aircraft, and 
helicopters.392 In the sense that an enlarged force required a larger budget to equip and 
operate, the Tatmadaw had institutionalized its budget as a state necessity.  
By the end of the market liberalization period, Myanmar became less of a 
praetorian state.393 The Tatmadaw responded to the gradual shift from its role as a 
forefront political agent to a more reserved position by increasing the military’s 
institutionalization, its necessity, and its ideology in the government apparatus. The 
events in 1988 were perceived by the junta as signs that a military-dominated one-party 
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socialist state could no longer meet the demands of a socialist form of governance.394 If 
the junta’s concession to pluralism was interpreted as an indication the military’s waning 
confidence in its ability to govern, then the flurry of new economic reforms initiated by 
the SPDC was evidence of the motivation of the Tatmadaw leaders to shape the market 
liberation process in their favor while they still possessed the means to do so.395 A 
summary of the institutions analysis of the market liberalization period is presented in 
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Methods and Means  Impacts on Political 
Economic Institutions 
Stagnation of the 
economy due to socialist 
policy 
Maintaining legitimacy 
to rule the country by 
distancing the 
Tatmadaw from the 
failure of socialism  
U Ne Win’s retirement, 
dissolving the BSPP, installation 
of the SLORC and SPDC, 
separation of the Tatmadaw 
members from political 
organization, introduction of 
capitalism  
Decreased reliance on the 
socialist state distribution 
system, introduction of market 
competition and privatization  
Protracted insurgency  Maintaining legitimacy 
to rule the country, quell 
insurgency either by 
force or through 
negotiations  
Cease fires with various 
insurgent groups, co-opt 
insurgent groups into the state 
apparatus, modernize the force 
(continue counterinsurgency 
operations) , entrenching the 
Tatmadaw’s necessity  
Co-opted insurgent groups 
became border patrols, 
legalization of border trade, 
institutionalization of military 
expenditures  
Chinese reforms, 
perestroika and glasnost, 
success of the export-
oriented strategy 
Maintaining legitimacy 
to rule the country 
preserving the union 
Self-reflection (impacts of 
underdevelopment caused by 
socialism)  
Created an drive toward 
capitalism and economic 
prosperity  
Political dissent and 
criticism of the regime’s 
repressive methods  
 
Maintenance of the 
legitimacy of the 
Tatmadaw, the union, 
and the ability to 
exercise force, quell 
dissent  
Pluralism, 1990 election, U Ne 
Win’s retirement, installation of 
the SLORC/SPDC, manipulation 
of judicial institutions (2008 
Constitution), embedding the 
Tatmadaw’s ideology in the 
government apparatus, 
institutionalization of the 
Tatmadaw’s expenditure as 
legitimate government spending  
Rule of law biased toward the 
Tatmadaw (inadequate to 
constrain self-interest 
behavior), lack of propriety 
created a biased toward short-
term gain causing government 
elites to grab and profit while 
in power, the regime became 
less praetorian  
Increasing necessity for 
enable bureaucracy and 
technocrats to run a 
modern state  
Tatmadaw-associated 
bureaucrats, senior civil 
servants, and elites 
maintaining their rents 
and access to state 
resources 
Some elites form coalitions with 
new private businesses, slowed 
SOE privatization, continued 
state monopoly on some 
economic sectors 
Some changes to decrease 
barrier to market entry, 
greater autonomy at the 
lowest level, skewed market 
competition (reserving 
lucrative industries as state 
monopoly and top-down 
creation of property rights to 
preserve the elites’ 
advantages) 
Centralized decision-
making norms, emphasis 
on loyalty, preference of 
personal politics over 
pragmatism  
Maintaining control of 
state decision-making 
modalities to perpetuate 
Tatmadaw interests 
Manipulation of formal 
institutions  
Limited growth of innovation 
and problem solving options 
 
Rise of Aung San Suu 
Kyi and pluralism  
Maintain relevance and 
prestige in the face of 
political opposition  
House arrested Aung San Suu 
Kyi, marginalized other political 
groups, used formal institution 
(2008 Constitution) to ensure 
representation of military 
interests, created of a new 
political party  
State decision-making norms 
continued to be dominated by 
Tatmadaw interests, vetted 
Tatmadaw interests at the 
highest level of governance  
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1. Findings  
By using institutions as a unit of analysis and the Tatmadaw as an actor/agent, a 
comparative analysis of the socialist and market liberalization periods revealed that the 
socialist trajectory was driven largely by military-associated factors. Nationalism, state 
building, freedom of military operations, and national security factors vectored Myanmar 
toward socialist authoritarianism. By choosing collective over private enterprises, the 
socialist state catered to the bureaucratization of the most rudimentary of collective 
efforts—national defense.396 Militarism of the socialist state was self-enforcing as the 
state relied on coercion to carry on its collective system.397 As the military became 
synonymous with the rule of law via its monopolization of force, militaristic organization 
norms (such as hierarchical and rigid decision-making norms with emphasis on loyalty) 
became infused into the government decision-making apparatus. While socialist 
institutions distorted the structure of the economy and incentivized clustering in certain 
sectors, personal exchanges became the preferred method of exchange in Myanmar’s 
political economy.398  
The market liberalization period (from 1988 to 2010) was driven largely by 
political factors and less so by militaristic factors. Large-scale civil unrest had hurt the 
Tatmadaw’s organizational credibility to rule. Rather than abdicating, maintaining the 
legitimacy to rule became an overriding incentive. The Tatmadaw commanders placated 
the population by making short-term concessions such as conceding to pluralism and then 
reverting on their position in the long term (military rule was re-imposed after 1990).  
When Myanmar’s government tried to reestablish the market in the late 1980s, the 
development of market institutions collided with existing socialist institutions. Socialist 
norms of strict controls, arbitrary policy making, and lack of standardization clashed with 
the market’s demand for autonomy, consistency, orderliness, and stability that reduced 
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business risk.399 Since top-down creation of institutions such as the rule of law, 
competition, and property rights institutions are timelier in execution than bottom-up (or 
organic) development, the Tatmadaw and Tatmadaw-associated elites used their positions 
in the government to situate themselves in advantageous positions. Although market 
institutions had materialized in Myanmar, they were skewed. Where the institutions were 
genuine, they existed only in small scale. It will be some time before Myanmar’s market 
institutions mature to the point where they can deliver their intended benefits to the entire 
economy.  
B. MYANMAR AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE  
The previous section established the foundations of how the Tatmadaw, as a 
political actor, shaped the development of Myanmar’s institutions; the following section 
uses the previous section’s findings and applies them in the analysis of Myanmar’s 
political economy within the developmental state framework. The lack of collaborative 
norm between the state and private enterprises, the political marginalization of the 
bureaucracy and the technocrats, and the politic-centric patterns of policy development 
were characteristics of the socialist period. Although the state was increasing taking cues 
from businesses during the market liberalization period, the preference of short- over 
long-term gains and politics over pragmatism had hampered the development of healthy 
cooperative norms.400  
1. On the Political Origins of Economic Institutions  
The interplay between domestic coalition dynamics, scarcity of natural resources, 
and severe security threats (collectively called systematic vulnerabilities) has been 
identified as the political origins of the economic institutions that necessitate the 
emergence of the developmental state.401 Although Myanmar’s political environment 
seemed to validate this model, being resource rich had circumvented the necessary 
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developmental imperatives to form. The socialist junta needed the population’s support, 
so it paid rents to the public sector via artificially depressed commodities prices and 
subsidies.402 Since the 1962 coup, the government in Yangon (and later Naypyidaw) 
faced a wide-scale insurgent threat in the border areas. Prolonged devotion of resources 
to fight the insurgents constrained the government’s budget.  
Since Myanmar has natural resources, deep ties between the military and the 
resource extraction companies, such as the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, had been 
filling the military’s coffers since the beginning of the socialist period.403 However, 
profits from resource extraction and other means to generate revenue could not meet the 
government’s expenditures and rent requirements, and Myanmar’s national deficit 
grew.404 Consequently, the government increased its reliance on foreign firms to extract 
more resources; a vicious cycle that arguably compromised Myanmar’s economic 
sovereignty.405  
Although Myanmar lacked the systematic vulnerabilities to motivate its leaders to 
invest in development-oriented economic institutions, Myanmar was not entirely doomed 
to dwell in underdevelopment. Although Singapore is the only developmental state in 
Southeast Asia, it was not the only country that grew. From 1962 to 2010, Myanmar 
functioned under authoritarianism in which the military’s monopoly of force acted as a 
disincentive for the Tatmadaw to co-opt any other social and political groups, including 
popular voters. But Myanmar’s political landscape was rapidly changing. Political 
reforms under President Thein Sein made great strides toward democratization. The 
transfer of political power from the Tatmadaw leaders to the NLD (following the party’s 
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victory in the relatively fair and open 2015 general election) marked the first time in fifty 
years that the military was not in charge of Myanmar’s government.406  
If Myanmar is capable of such a drastic shift in political institutions without 
foreign intervention, a massive upraising, or widespread civil war, it is possible that 
development-oriented economic institutions would emerge in Myanmar. A structural 
approach such as the system vulnerability model is useful in predicting whether a country 
will someday become a developmental state. However, to create a picture of how or why 
an actor such as the Tatmadaw is incentivized to create, perpetuate, or destroy 
development-oriented economic institutions, a close examination of the interacting 
mechanisms is required.  
2. Leadership, the Government, and the Bureaucracy  
Two complementary characteristics of the developmental state are a soft 
authoritarian government and the existence of development-oriented elites.407 From 1948 
to 1962, Myanmar had a cadre of Indians and Chinese capitalists who were oriented 
toward economic development.408 But U Nu’s preoccupation with religion (such as 
designating Buddhism as Myanmar’s national religion) widened social cleavages.409 
Ethnicity and religion became a heated issue in politics; little room was left for economic 
development debates.  
After the 1962 coup, socialist policies caused the exodus of Myanmar’s capitalist 
class and destroyed incentives for entrepreneurship. The absence of elites who favored 
development did not imply that the Tatmadaw leaders wanted to govern a country that 
existed in perpetual poverty; rather, the Tatmadaw leaders had other imperatives that 
overrode development. The post-independence ethnic factionalism issues had turned into 
a large insurgency. In the minds of many Tatmadaw leaders, the threat of the 
disintegration of the union was more immediate than addressing economic issues.  
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The Myanmar state coalesced in 1974 after the new constitution officially 
established a socialist unitary party state under the BSPP. Arguably, the BSPP’s TYP was 
evidence that many of the BSPP leaders were developmentally oriented and that the 
Tatmadaw leaders understood the link between economic prosperity and national 
security. Regardless, in economic policy making, this link was inadequate t overcoming 
the “primacy of politics over economics” and the regime’s “emphasis on political 
expediency and short-term results” to dismiss political discontent.410 Consequently, 
Myanmar remained an inward-looking socialist state for fourteen more years before the 
unrest in 1988 catalyzed a change.  
The colonial experience had bred the military’s distrust in government 
administrators. Once in power, Myanmar’s civil service was damaged by “repeated 
purges, politicization, absurdly low wages, and unchecked corruption.”411 As military 
officers were appointed to senior bureaucrats and ministerial posts (some officers had 
management experience from the caretaker period, but most lacked the skills and 
experience to perform the duties of those they replaced), Myanmar’s state capacity 
declined. For decades, the government experienced problems accomplishing simple 
administrative tasks such as collecting revenue and maintaining logistics for the army.412 
Where the developmental state insulated its technocrats and trusted its bureaucracy to 
carry out tasks, the Tatmadaw discriminated them. 
3. State-Private Enterprise Cooperation  
The government-business relationship in the developmental state model is 
characterized by state intervention via cooperative relationships with private businesses. 
Under socialism, Myanmar’s private enterprises virtually disappeared, and the 
government’s priority shifted toward state security rather than economic development. 
When the Tatmadaw superimposed military norms, government-business relationships 
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became defined by personal politics and loyalty.413 Autonomy and innovation were 
constrained by strict centralized hierarchical decision-making norms. Nationalization of 
private enterprises eliminated entrepreneurship. With an insignificant private sector to 
provide cues, Myanmar’s socialist government made a blunder out of its economy for 
more than twenty years.  
After the Myanmar’s government abandoned socialism in 1989, various measures 
were enacted to promote the private sector. The government liberalized much of the 
agriculture and import/export sector, opened its borders, and attempted to privatize the 
SOEs.414 Although the reforms contributed to a significant growth of the number of small 
to medium-sized enterprises, institutional inefficiencies carried over from the socialist 
period continued to hamper the development of fair market competition.  
An example in which state security overrode market and business signals (and 
caused the stagnation of a business sector) was Myanmar’s rice policy. The objective of 
Myanmar’s rice policy was to control and keep the prices of basic commodities low and 
to sustain SOE’s investments.415 Myanmar has always been an agrarian society with 
many small farmers dominating the private sector. During the socialist years, Myanmar’s 
private trade and manufacturing sector existed in limited capacity. Although the state 
nationalized land, agriculture was not collectivized in large scale as in China, Vietnam, or 
the Soviet Union.416 Myanmar farmers were given tillage rights as “tenants” to the state 
land.417 Private sale of crops was forbidden, and farmers had to deliver a quota of crops 
to the government at a fixed price.  
For political stability and internal security purposes, strong fears of losing control 
of the rice sector provided the government with justification to continue to pursue its 
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policy even if the cost was a virtual stasis of agricultural innovation.418 Socialist policies 
created disincentives for farmers to increase their investment or productivity. Since the 
farmers were not allowed to take advantage of the economy-of-scale or market 
incentives, it was difficult for Myanmar to achieve the necessary comparative advantage 
in rice. And without the benefits of comparative advantage, self-sufficiency in agriculture 
would be difficult to achieve since the Myanmar’s government would always spend more 
to produce the same commodities than other countries with the advantage.419  
4. Growth Strategy  
While the developmental state model’s industrial strategy includes a combined 
effort between the government and the private sector toward upgrading human capital to 
fulfill the requirements to shift the country’s comparative advantage toward industrial 
and services sectors, Myanmar had no comparable strategy.420 Economic policies passed 
during the market liberalization period may have allowed the private sector to develop. 
And to a small degree, the private sector did benefit from the government’s attempt to 
provide low-cost infrastructure and basic services.421 While the developmental state’s 
private sectors reaped long-term benefits from government intervention, extensive and 
prolonged government intervention had weakened Myanmar’s SOE and the rice sector. In 
terms of the type and scale of government intervention, Myanmar’s form of government 
intervention differed in intent and character from that of the developmental states. 
Socialism is an almost polar opposite to the developmental state model. While 
socialism was inward looking, the developmental state policies were outward oriented. 
The developmental state relied on a global comparative advantage while socialism relied 
on self-sufficiency. Although the ISI phase of the developmental state strategy shared an 
inward-looking character with socialism, there are differences between ISI and socialism. 
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Private enterprises were protected under ISI but were severely marginalized or eliminated 
via nationalization under socialism.422 Socialism in Myanmar was motivated by the 
Tatmadaw’s goal to prevent the political disintegration of the state and the alignment of 
self-sufficiency with nationalism.423  
At the general level, there are similarities in Myanmar’s social and political 
structure during both the socialist and the market liberalization periods. First, there was a 
lack of a strong and independent capitalist class. From 1962 to 1988, Myanmar’s Indians, 
Chinese, and other capitalists left the country, and the state concentrated on growing and 
developing SOEs at the expense of whatever was left of the private sector. When 
socialism was abolished by the SLORC, small and medium-sized private enterprises did 
expand but they came nowhere close to the strength of the capitalist class that existed 
before nationalization. Large capital-intensive industries and companies were under the 
ownership of the state (like those in oil and gas sector), belonged to one of the two 
military-related giant conglomerations, were under joint ownership with foreigners, or 
belonged to prominent military families. In a social structure that lacked a strong 
independent capitalist class, alternatives to government-derived ideas and policies were 
severely limited.  
The shift from ISI to EOI was the turning point for the developmental state 
model. While Latin American economies stagnated from their continuation of ISI 
policies, the Asian NICs boomed because they switched.424 Since Myanmar abandoned 
socialism and liberalized its economy, technically the shift from ISI toward EOI had 
occurred. Since changing the orientation of a sovereign state’s economy occurred over 
time, from 1988 to 2010, Myanmar’s economy arguably fell between ISI and EOI.  
The release of socialist-imposed pent-up demand for consumer goods, the lack of 
industrialization of production facilities, and the low-hanging-fruit nature of the domestic 
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market were favorable conditions for ISI.425 Yet, the opening of new markets turned 
many domestic businesses into exporters.426 The simultaneous development of export-
oriented and import-substitutions-based firms indicated the transitional nature of 
Myanmar’s political economic environment. It is possible that once the domestic demand 
becomes saturated, more firms will turn outward. Myanmar’s government had been 
attenuating the competition between private firms and SOEs by using formal institutions 
to restrict the growth of the private sector. But this strategy is only effective in the near 
and immediate timeframe. As Myanmar becomes more integrated into the world market, 
the numbers of domestic economic agents will likely increase and so will the pressure for 
economic reforms. A summary of the comparative between the socialist and the market 
liberalization periods in relation to the developmental state model is provided in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Analysis of the Developmental State Model, the Socialist Period 
(1962–1988), and the Market Liberalization Period (1988–2010) 
 Developmental State 
Model 
Socialist Period Market Liberalization 
Period 
Leadership  Developmentally oriented 
elites with the desire to break 
out of underdevelopment  
Military elite (shaped by colonial 
and independence experience) 
with the desire to prevent the 
disintegration of the state of 
Myanmar  
− Military elites responding 
to decline organization 
legitimacy  
− Military elites motivated to 




− Resource constraints  
− Serious threats demanding 
large defense expenditure  
− Elites needed broad 
coalition; rents required to 
maintain the coalition  
− Resource rich: state 
monopolization of resource 
extraction  
− Threats from insurgency  
− Artificially depressed 
commodities prices and 
subsidies became the state’s 
rents for the population  
− State maintained the 
monopoly on resource 
extraction sector; emphasis 
on economic sovereignty 
aspects of national security 





Import Substitution follow by 
export-oriented 
industrialization 
− Autarky and centralized 
socialist economy  
− Nationalization of the private 
sector  
Outward oriented in general, 
mixture between indigenous 






Technocrats and the 
bureaucracy enjoyed relative 
freedom for political capture  
− Technocrats/bureaucrats 
marginalized by the military  
− Senior bureaucratic positions 
replaced by military members; 
politicization of ministers 
position  
− Military-imposed centralized 
decision making 
− Bureaucratic performance 
motivated by personal 
relationships and patronages  
Two opposing groups: 
bureaucrats and technocrats 
who resisted liberalization of 
SOE for fear of losing rents, 
revenues, employment, and 
prestige vs. those who became 
more enabled by requirements 





− Alliance between the state 
and the producer class  
− Government create a stable 
business environment  
− The state takes market cues 
from businesses  
− Competition incentivize 
production, efficiency, and 
innovation  
− Nationalization of private 
enterprises 
− Government-business 
relationship defined by personal 
politics and constrained by 
centralized decision-making 
norms  
− State-directed procurement 
system, no feedback from 
businesses, limited feedback 
from the market  
− State became synonymous with 
producer class  
− The state increasingly take 
market cues from businesses 
but government monopolies 
and prevalence of personal 
politics continued to hamper 
the development of fair and 
open competition 
institutions 
− Business environment 
remain uncertain due to 
prevalence of personal 
politics  
− State and producer class are 
dominated by the 
Tatmadaw-associated elites  
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5. Findings  
Overall, Myanmar’s political economy has more differences than similarities with 
the developmental state model. If the core insight of the developmental state is that 
government intervention can solve market failures, then Myanmar had the intervention 
part somewhat right with regard to the way economic decisions became centralized under 
socialist ideology.427 Myanmar’s outward orientation after abandoning socialism is also 
similar with the developmental state’s outward-looking strategy. Beyond these two broad 
generalities, Myanmar greatly diverges from the developmental state model. While the 
developmental state’s approach focused on solving the coordination problem, the 
Myanmar’s government focused on national security (at the onset of socialism) and later 
national security and politics (at the onset of market liberalization).428 Myanmar is 
resource rich; however, its inability to fully exploit its natural resources had led to heavy 
reliance on foreign interests. This dependency is a direct threat to Myanmar’s economic 
sovereignty, but one that is not serious enough to the drive Myanmar toward 
industrialization the way severe cuts in foreign aid did for South Korea and Taiwan. The 
lack of direct state support for private-sector industrialization and the continued 
monopoly of various sectors by the SOE are evidence that a strong coordinated effort to 
push Myanmar toward industrialization is still lacking.  
C. CONCLUSION  
The clash between socialist institutions and the demands for market institutions 
resulted in a mixture of conditions. To a degree, socialist norms persisted in the continued 
existence of state monopolies in many economic sectors. And to a degree, the increased 
number of small and medium-sized businesses indicated that market institutions were 
working to promote entrepreneurship. The demands for enabled bureaucrats and 
technocrats to run a modern state had, to a small degree, decentralized government 
decision making at the lowest levels. Since the Tatmadaw elites in government were 
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responsible for the top-down formalization of institutions, they had placed themselves in 
advantageous market positions. The judicial system in which verdicts were expected to 
be in favor of the state, the barriers of entry for lucrative markets, and the rule of law that 
was unable to deter self-interest behaviors were manifestations of the distortions in 
Myanmar’s political economic institutions at the end of the market liberalization period.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A comparative analysis of the socialist period (1962–1988) and market 
liberalization period (1988–2010) revealed that the Tatmadaw was a political actor and an 
organization that brought sociopolitical changes to Myanmar via its monopoly of force. 
Since the Tatmadaw leadership consisted of a small cadre of individuals, the cadre’s 
experiences, perceptions, values, and norms became imbedded in the informal and formal 
government institutions that were developed under the military regime. As a result, 
Myanmar’s institutions became infused with those of the military.  
Militaristic organizational norms such as close adherence of a hierarchical 
structure of authority, top placement of security as a priority, and the emphasis on 
personal loyalty were amplified in Myanmar’s state formal institutions. This was 
evidenced in the 1974 Constitutions and various laws and legislations passed by the 
socialist junta under General Ne Win. The blend of military-centric institutions 
superimposed on Myanmar’s traditional political, social, and economic institutions 
resulted in a prevailing norm of personal politics over pragmatism. The disjointed and 
sometimes contradictory nature of Myanmar’s economic policies from 1962 to 2010 was 
an unfortunate materialization of a government and a society that operated under such 
modus operandi.  
The Tatmadaw’s connection to politics was rooted in the historical involvement 
of its leaders in Myanmar’s independence movement. In the late 1950s to early 1960s, 
fragile parliamentary government institutions combined with political chaos that 
threatened to tear the fledgling state apart gave the Tatmadaw an existential reason to 
intervene. In 1962, the Tatmadaw used its status as a national institution and its 
monopoly of force to launch a coup and to direct a shift of Myanmar’s institutional 
structure toward socialism.  
Under socialist ideology, militaristic norms such as hierarchical decision making 
and rigid adherence of rules were informally imposed onto the government. As military 
members became political leaders, personal loyalty and connection to the military 
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eclipsed merit and productivity as requirements for advancement in the government 
sector. The BSPP’s cadre and its military members formalized the Tatmadaw as the 
epicenter of Myanmar’s government. While nationalization of private enterprises 
eliminated Myanmar’s capitalist class, the planned socialist distribution system insulated 
Myanmar’s economy from market forces. With the bureaucracy and the business class 
marginalized, political power became concentrated on a small group of senior military 
leaders who, in turn, became Myanmar’s new elite. As the masses were buying into self-
sufficiency and unity under the socialist banner, the Tatmadaw was institutionalizing 
itself into Myanmar’s state structure.  
Since socialism hampered the development of the institutions of exchange that are 
crucial to the success of a developmental state, the decline of Myanmar’s economy can 
be explained in terms of missing institutions and their corresponding developmental state 
features. Top-down militaristic hierarchical decision making meant the Myanmar’s 
government was not taking economic and allocation cues from the private sector or the 
market. The majority of Myanmar’s bureaucrats were restricted and faced political 
repercussions for expressing ideas and views that were contrary to the military’s socialist 
vision. Without market competition, Myanmar’s economy was plagued with transactional 
inefficiencies and shortages. For political reasons, the Myanmar’s government was 
focused on artificially controlling prices of basic commodities. The regime manipulated 
foreign exchange and created a monopoly of the resource-extraction sector. Distorted 
government priorities caused the absence of developmental state characteristics in 
Myanmar’s political economy.  
The military regime’s abrupt official embracing of capitalism in 1989 was an 
example of the Tatmadaw’s position as a political actor with the power to bring drastic 
social changes to Myanmar. In 1988, the Tatmadaw still had a monopoly of force, albeit 
growing public dissent over poor economic conditions and political repression had 
degraded the regime’s ability to unilaterally exercise its monopoly. Unlike the 
introduction of socialism, market liberalization was motivated more by politics than by 
militaristic or nationalistic goals. The scale of the 1988 protest posed an existential threat 
to the nation (in terms of a potential civil war) and to the Tatmadaw’s primacy in politics. 
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Although pluralism and an election endangered the Tatmadaw’s dominance by creating 
political opponents, the Tatmadaw ceded to these actions because they were short-term 
means to appease the public. The regime’s return to power in 1990 under the guise of the 
SLORC/SPDC was an indication that the junta was not ready to give up its role as a 
political actor.  
To a lesser degree, other forces pushed Myanmar toward capitalism. Increasingly, 
the requirements to run a modern state had moved the regime to recognize the importance 
of a more empowered bureaucracy in strengthening the state’s governance capacity. 
Economically, during the socialist era, the competition between military elites for access 
to resources in the socialist state structure gave birth to military-run business 
conglomerates and the crony capitalist class. To a degree, military businesses and a small 
group of elite capitalists welcomed market liberalization because of the possibility of new 
markets and the opportunity to profit from their advantageous domestic economic 
position. Typically, the development of capitalism is a gradual process that at minimum 
requires a middle class, a supply of labor, and an industrious attitude.429 For Myanmar, 
the shifts to socialism in 1962 and to capitalism in 1988 were relatively abrupt because 
they were top-down directed: a result of the authoritarian nature of the Tatmadaw’s 
control of the government and the organization’s control over means of coercion.  
During the market liberalization period, Myanmar’s government moved closer to 
creating conditions that are conducive to the development of healthy market institutions, 
such as property rights and the rule of law. The liberalization of trade had allowed 
grassroots business to bloom. In some sectors, government intervention was reduced to 
issuing relatively speedy permits for small to medium-sized businesses (as long as they 
did not compete with state-run sectors). Where domestic businesses were allowed 
unhampered access to new markets, productivity soared. Contrarily, sectors where the 
government maintained production and pricing control (such as of rice) continued to 
encounter roadblocks to increasing production efficiencies.  
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The gains that Myanmar’s government made were offset by some setbacks. The 
state remained reliant on exploitation of its natural resources for revenue. Because the 
resource-extraction sector is under state monopoly, transparency on deals, profit sharing, 
and streams of revenue were limited. Myanmar’s dependence on foreign investment to 
extract resources had become a recognized national liability especially concerning its 
contractual relationship with China. While in control, the Tatmadaw had institutionalized 
its interest in the judicial system. As a result, true fairness in the rule of law had not been 
instituted. To a large degree, businesses still rely on personal relationships, patronages, 
and clientele advantages vice bona fide candid and open competition. Property rights 
remain a problem for Myanmar’s farmers, as many still grow crops under tillage 
privileges. The overall business environment in Myanmar has improved since 1988; but 
pockets of uncertainty where entrepreneurial risk remains high still exist.  
At the end of 2010, Myanmar had a long way to go to develop the necessary 
institutions and structures to undergo the developmental state transformation. Myanmar is 
a newcomer to the world market compared to other Asian economies. In 2010, 
Myanmar’s industries were mostly labor-intensive light manufacturing (such as garments 
and other consumer goods). In this sector, Myanmar faced fierce competition from other 
Asian economies, especially from China, which had been engaging in labor-intensive 
industries since the late 1940s. To replicate the developmental state’s industrialization 
strategy, Myanmar first needed to develop the necessary heavy industries; given the 
current configuration of Myanmar’s economy, this is an achievable milestone only in the 
long term.  
Under socialism, Myanmar seemed to validate findings that militaristic 
institutions do not necessarily lead to the state playing a positive role in hastened 
economic growth, especially in less developed countries.430 The rise of the NLD presents 
an opportunity for Myanmar to put some distance between the state and militaristic 
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institutions.431 But it would be premature to believe that with the NLD, Myanmar’s 
economic problems will be instantly solved. From a democratic viewpoint, the NLD may 
have been a welcome challenger to the Tatmadaw’s monopoly of political power. 
Nevertheless, the NLD’s inexperience in governance has the potential to become a source 
of tension between the old regime and the new. Given that Myanmar’s bureaucrats and 
technocrats are still recovering from decades of marginalization under military rule, the 
NLD’s administration still risks encountering problems that stem from a weakened state 
capacity. Along with unresolved political issues, such as what to do about the minority 
ethnic groups, the NLD faces daunting political challenges. We can logically infer that, 
under the NLD’s leadership, building market economic institutions may not be 
Myanmar’s top priority in the short term.  
Although well-designed institutions can compensate for poor leadership 
performance, perversely bad leadership can destroy an otherwise well-organized division 
of labor.432 Capable leadership can occasionally make the most of shaky institutions, but 
institutions can be so poor that even the best leadership cannot compensate for their 
deficiencies.433 In sum, it will take time for Myanmar’s market institutions to mature. As 
ownership rights and contractual freedom become institutionalized, incentives are 
generated for individuals to engage in activities that move resources from low to high 
utility.434 As complex exchanges become less costly, attaining growth and development 
goals shifts closer to reality.  
There are promising signs that Myanmar’s middle class is growing and barriers to 
market entry for small and medium-sized businesses have largely eroded. Regardless, 
there are many areas for improvement. As Myanmar and the United States begin to 
formulate an economic relationship, the United States is in a position to incentivize the 
development of market institutions. Rather than concentrating investments in building 
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roads and other infrastructures, tailoring aid and building a relationship that rewards 
Myanmar for playing by the rules would reinforce the value of property rights, fair 
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